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ARE CREDIT CARD LATE FEES UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
Seana Valentine Shiffrin"
ABSTRACT
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell articulated serious
and specific constitutional constraints upon the imposition of punitive damages. Justice
Kennedy's majority opinion announced that, apart from exceptional cases, punitive
damages should not exceed nine times the amount of the actual losses sustained by the
plaintiff and should usually be far lower. Indeed, the opinion observed, they typically
should be much lower, citing double, treble, and quadruple multipliers as "instructive"
examples. Some commentators have worried that the decision could adversely affect
consumer interests by offering insulation for tortious behavior that is difficult to detect
or litigate. This Article will explore, however, the decision's unheralded ramifications
for contract law, ones that may serve consumer interests.
The constitutional standards articulated in State Farm call into question the consti-
tutionality of those statutes and regulations that authorize credit card issuers to charge
legally enforceable late penalties but place no significant limitations on their size.
Analyzed through the lens of traditional contract law, these penalties are punitive
damages for breach that, as such, would typically be invalidated but for positive legis-
lative efforts to override this traditional treatment. Through federal and state statutes
and regulations, credit card companies have gained government authorization to levy
enforceable penalties that far exceed what the guidelines identified in State Farm
permit. To be precise, disproportionately high credit card late fees themselves are not
unconstitutional, but State Farm calls into constitutional question their legal enforce-
ment. It also calls into constitutional question the federal and state statutes that
authorize and facilitate the imposition of these high late fees, which override both
consumer protection statutes to the contrary and traditional contract doctrines that
entirely disallow punitive damages.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2003, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell' imposed
serious and specific constitutional constraints on the imposition of punitive damages.
The decision, capping a series of cases that developed constitutional limits on puni-
tive damages grounded in procedural and substantive due process,2 represents the
538 U.S. 408 (2003) (finding a punitive damage award of $145 million for a harm
worth $1 million in compensatory damages violated the due process protections of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
2 Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001) (finding the
Due Process Clause implicated if fines are grossly excessive); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore,
517 U.S. 559 (1996) (finding a $2 million punitive damage award excessive on a number
of factors including that defendant's conduct was not particularly egregious); Honda Motor
Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994) (striking down a $5 million punitive damage award that
accompanied a compensatory damage award of under $1 million); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991) (finding punitive damages did not violate due process when
objectively reasonable criteria were met).
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most specific articulation of the constitutional limits on punitive damages. Justice
Kennedy's majority opinion announced that, apart from exceptional circumstances,
punitive damages should not exceed nine times the amount of the actual losses sus-
tained by the plaintiff.3 Indeed, the opinion observed, punitive damages typically
should be much lower, citing double, treble, and quadruple multipliers as "instruc-
tive" examples.4
Some commentators have worried that the decision could adversely affect con-
sumer interests by offering insulation for tortious behavior that is difficult to detect
or litigate. 5 This Article will explore the decision's unrecognized ramifications for
contract law that can serve other consumer interests. Specifically, the constitutional
standards articulated in State Farm call into question the constitutionality of those
statutes and regulations that authorize credit card companies to charge late penalties
without placing significant limitations on their size.6 Analyzed through the lens of
traditional contract law, these penalties are punitive damages for breach that, as a stan-
dard matter, would be invalidated but for positive legislative efforts to override this
traditional treatment. Through these federal and state statutes and regulations, credit
card companies gain government authorization to levy enforceable penalties that sur-
pass what the guidelines established in State Farm permit.7
To be precise, disproportionately high credit card late fees themselves are not
unconstitutional, but State Farm calls into constitutional question their legal enforce-
ment. It also calls into constitutional question the federal and state statutes and regu-
lations that authorize and facilitate their imposition, which override both consumer
protection statutes to the contrary and traditional contract doctrines that entirely dis-
allow punitive damages.
Part I provides a brief overview of the relevant legal history of credit card late
fees and gives a prdcis of the argument against credit card late fees. Part II argues
that State Farm applies to the context of credit cards, to contract law more generally,
and to legislative authorizations of penalties. Part Il establishes that credit card late
fees are penalties that transgress the limits established by State Farm. Part IV dis-
cusses state action. This Article then concludes with a brief discussion of whether
limits on credit card late fees would in fact serve the interests of consumers.
I State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425.
4 Id.
' See, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE
L.J. 347, 400-01 (2003) (suggesting that State Farm's cap may interfere with the use of
punitive damages to deter the production of harms on nonpresent plaintiffs that are difficult
to detect); Stephen C. Yeazell, Punitive Damages, Descriptive Statistics, and the Economy
of Civil Litigation, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 2025, 2041-42 (2004) (describing litigation
incentives State Farm may create that may cause a "geographical maldistribution of punitive
damages awards"); see also Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages
and Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1393, 1418-54 (1993) (criticizing punitive damage
caps on deterrence and retributive justice grounds).
6 See infra Part II.
7 See infra Part uI.A.2.
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I. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND THE BASIC ARGUMENT
A. A Brief Recent History of the Legal Treatment of Credit Card Late Fees
Credit card late charges have risen exponentially in the last decade. "In eight
years, the major card companies have increased the fee charged to cardholders for
being even an hour late with a payment to $39, from $10 or less."' Late charges are
assessed in addition to the (typically high) interest charged on outstanding balances.
While some companies have tiered structures that vary the size of the late fee accord-
ing to the outstanding balance, many do not.9 Some calibrate the size of the late charge
in light of the credit rating and credit history of the consumer.'° Few calibrate the
late charge depending on how late the payment is-whether an hour or two weeks."
Late fees represent a brisk business. In 2002, it was reported that credit card companies
collected $7.3 billion in late fees annually. 2
Nationally, credit card late fees began creeping up to very high levels after 1995
when the Comptroller of the Currency issued a regulation interpreting § 85 of the
National Bank Act (NBA). 3 The regulation interpreted the NBA to permit credit cards
administered by nationally-chartered banks to charge customers in any state whatever
late fees are permitted by the home state of the bank.'4 Nearly twenty years before,
8 Patrick McGeehan, Soaring Interest Is Compounding Credit Card Woesfor Millions,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2004, at Al; see also U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABIUTY OFFICE,
CREDIT CARDS: INCREASED COMPLEXITY IN RATES AND FEES HEIGHTENS NEED FOR MORE
EFFECTIVE DISCLOsuRES 18 (2006) (reporting exponential rise in late fees since the 1990s);
Cardweb.com, Late Fees (Jan. 28, 2005), http://www.cardweb.com/cardtrak/news/2005/
January/28a.html (reporting that Citigroup, MBNA, Bank of America, and Providian levy
a $39 late fee and that the other major credit card companies charge $35).
9 See 2005 Credit Card Survey: Card Companies Use Common 'Risk Factors' to Im-
pose Unfair Rate Hikes, Finds CA, CONSUMER ACTION NEWS (San Francisco Consumer
Action, San Francisco, Cal.), Summer 2005, at 1, 2, available at http://www.consumer-
action.org/archives/English/CANews/2005_CreditCardSurvey/CC-Issue-2005.pdf
[hereinafter 2005 Credit Card Survey] (detailing the number of credit cards whose late fee
plans are tiered and those that are not).
'o See id.
" See id.
12 See Cardweb.com, Late Fee Bug (May 17,2002), http://www.cardweb.com/cardtrak/
news/2002/may/17a.html; see also U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note
8, at 72 (reporting that the six largest credit card issuers charged a combined $7.4 billion in
late fees and overlimit fees in 2005); ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE
TWO-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 141
(2003) (citing a $7 billion figure for late fees charged in 2003); McGeehan, supra note 8
(reporting $11.7 billion in penalty fees of all kinds in 2003); Cardweb.com, Fee Party (Jan.
13, 2005), http://www.cardweb.com/cardtrak/news/2005/january/13a.html (reporting that
consumers were assessed $14.8 billion in late fees and overlimit fees in 2004).
'3 The National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2000).
14 12 C.F.R. § 7.4001 (2006) (interpreting 12 U.S.C. § 85).
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Marquette National Bank v. First of Omaha Service Corp. 15 affirmed that § 85 of the
NBA authorizes a nationally-chartered bank to apply its home state's interest rate to
those transactions occurring in other states in which standard, percentage-based interest
rates are charged on outstanding principal. 16 The unanimous Court in Marquette held
that a Nebraska bank's credit card solicitations and credit transactions in Minnesota
did not locate the bank's credit card program in Minnesota.17 Rather, for purposes
of the NBA, a nationally-chartered bank and its credit card programs are located where
the bank designates its operations of discount and deposit.' 8 The Marquette decision,
in essence, permitted nationally-chartered banks to navigate around state usury laws
that imposed more restrictive regulations on standard interest rates and to substitute,
or export, the higher interest rates allowed by their more permissive home states.' 9 As
a consequence, many banks relocated to states such as Delaware and South Dakota
that offered permissive legal environments. 20 The permission to "export" home state
interest rates also reached federally-insured state-chartered banks through the Deposi-
tory Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDA).2' DIDA
extends the same powers to federally-insured state-chartered banks that the NBA
extends to nationally-chartered banks.22
The comptroller's 1995 regulation took a new step beyond permitting the exporta-
tion of interest rates on principal. It classified late charges as forms of "interest" for the
purposes of the NBA.23 Thereby, the common and statutory laws of the states in which
these charges were imposed were effectively pre-empted by the laws of the banks'
home states. Banks covered by the NBA (and by extension, those covered by DIDA)
were now permitted to impose late charges in accordance with the laws of their home
state rather than the state in which the charges were incurred.24
By no coincidence, the major credit card issuers have chosen to locate in those
states that passed statutes regarding consumer and/or credit contracts that override
the common law presumption that penalty clauses in contracts are typically unenforce-
able. Except in special circumstances, such as fraud, the common law of contract does
15 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
16 Id. at 310-11.
17 See id. at 310.
18 Id. at 309-10.
'9 See id. at 318-19.
20 See Samuel Issacharoff & Erin F. Delaney, Credit Card Accountability, 73 U. CHI. L.
REv. 157, 160-61 (2006).
21 12 U.S.C. § 1831d (2000).
22 See id.
23 12 C.F.R. § 7.4001. This regulation was presaged by the result in Greenwood Trust
Co. v. Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818, 829 (1 st Cir. 1992) (interpreting relevant portions of the
NBA and DIDA as adopting the home state's full law of usury and applying this result to late
charges), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1052 (1993).
24 See, e.g., Greenwood Trust, 971 F.2d 818 (finding DIDA pre-empted state law on the
issue of credit card late fees).
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not permit the imposition of punitive damages, whether directly by a court or indirectly
through the mechanism of prior agreement by the parties, in the form of liquidated
damages clauses.25 Usually, the damages available in contract law are those that
represent actual losses or, when liquidated damages are appropriate, those that provide
a reliable, agreed upon approximation of actual losses.26 These common law presump-
tions, however, can be overridden by state statutes. Many states have statutes exempt-
ing credit card charges from standard restrictions on penalty assessments, permitting
the imposition of late charges that do not represent an approximation of actual losses.27
A credit card program run by a bank that falls under the scope of the NBA or DIDA
that is headquartered in such a state may therefore charge high late penalties nationally,
irrespective of the common law and the consumer protection law of the customer's
home state or the state in which the transaction occurred.28 In an "if you can't beat
them, join them" concession, many states altered their consumer protection laws to
draw the business of banks after it became clear that these federal regulations evis-
cerated their ability to protect consumers through consumer protection statutes.29
25 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981); 22 AM. JUR. 2D
Damages § 500 (2003); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.8 (3d ed. 1999).
26 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1981). Liquidated damages clauses
are usually permitted only when actual losses would be difficult to calculate at the time of
breach. It is doubtful that this condition is met in the case of late payments on credit cards,
but that issue is left aside here. See also U.C.C. § 2-718 (2003).
27 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 950 (2001) (allowing delinquency charges to be
assessed under Delaware law without specifying a limit and declaring that no such charge
"shall be deemed void as a penalty or otherwise unenforceable under any statute or the common
law"); 205 ILL. COMP. STAT. 675/6 (2000) (allowing any late fees or delinquency charges
articulated in credit plan); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 97A.090, 99.050 (1994 & Supp. 1999) (stating
that the term "interest" includes late fees and that parties may agree to any interest rate and
fees); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 384-G: 10 (2002) (stating banks may set late charges on revolving
credit accounts and that no such charge "shall be deemed void as a penalty or otherwise un-
enforceable under any statute or the common law"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-26.1-9(a)(b) (2004)
(using language virtually identical to Delaware and New Hampshire); S.D. CODIFIED LAws
§§ 54-3-1, -1.1 (2006) (classifying late charges as interest and declaring there to be no
maximum interest rate in South Dakota); UTAH CODE ANN. § 70C-2-102(1)(b) (1997)
(permitting late charges without limitation under Utah Law after 1999); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 6.1-330.63(A) (2001) (permitting imposition of late fees under Virginia law notwith-
standing any statute or other law to the contrary).
28 See 12 U.S.C. § 85; 12 C.F.R. § 7.4001.
29 New Jersey once had strong consumer protections against high late charges. In light
of Marquette National Bank v. First of Omaha Service Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978), and Smiley
v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735 (1996), it elected to try to compete for bankbusiness instead. Compare
Sherman v. Citibank, 668 A.2d 1036, 1040, 1049 (N.J. 1995) (holding, under pre-Smiley
analysis of New Jersey law, late payment fees at first illegal and then limited to $10 and denying
that NBA and DIDA pre-empted such a holding), vacated, Greenwood Trust Co. v. Hunter,
517 U.S. 1241 (1996), rev'd, Sherman v. Citibank, 679 A.2d 652 (1996) (on the grounds of
Smiley pre-emption), with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:3B-29(4)(b) (West 2000) (legislative findings
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The 1995 regulation was challenged on the grounds that late charges are not
really forms of interest, and therefore, do not fall under the scope of the NBA's expor-
tation doctrine. This challenge was unanimously rejected in 1996 in Smiley v. Citibank,
a case involving a California consumer and a national bank headquartered in South
Dakota.30 After Smiley resolved the uncertainty of the exportation doctrine involv-
ing late charges in favor of the credit card companies, higher credit card late fees pro-
liferated nationally.3
The litigation in Smiley, however, solely concerned issues of statutory interpreta-
tion. The case addressed the question of whether the comptroller's regulatory interpre-
tation of the term "interest" in the NBA to encompass late fees was reasonable, and con-
cluded that the comptroller's regulatory interpretation was entitled to Chevron defer-
323ence." It did not grapple with the constitutionality of the regulation.33 In particular,
and declaration), and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:3B-39 (West 2000) (authorizing late charges
without any guidelines or amount limits). See generally DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD
SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WrrH PLASTIC: THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION IN BUYING AND BOR-
ROWING 70 (2d ed. 2005) (reporting that states modified usury laws after Marquette to attract
credit card companies); WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 12, at 235 n.71 (citing pressure on
state legislatures to relax usury laws because of interstate competition); Issacharoff &
Delaney, supra note 20, at 164 (reporting Maine's legislature gave up on legislation designed
to protect consumers on the grounds that its only effect would be to harm or drive away
Maine banks); Mark Furletti, Comment, The Debate Over the National Bank Act and the
Preemption of State Efforts to Regulate Credit Cards, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 425,442,450 (2004)
(discussing the changes in state law after Marquette and Smiley).
30 Smiley, 517 U.S. at 739-47 (according deference to the comptroller's statutory in-
terpretation). Smiley held that the late charges levied by Citibank against California resi-
dents could be set by Citibank at whatever rate was permitted by South Dakota law. Id. This
decision permitted Citibank to take advantage of S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § § 54-3-1 to -1.1
(1990 & Supp. 1995) (classifying late charges as forms of interest and declaring there to be
no maximum interest rate in South Dakota).
31 See U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 8, at 18 (reporting expo-
nential rise in late fees since 1995); Issacharoff & Delaney, supra note 20, at 163 (reporting
late fees have tripled in the last ten years and now account for a major proportion of credit
card company revenue); see also Cardweb.com, Late Fee Bug, supra note 12 (reporting that
between 1996 and 2002, late fees rose from an average of $13.28 to an average of $29.84);
Cardweb.com, Late Fees, supra note 8 (reporting an immediate spike in late fees in 1997
after Smiley, from an average of $14.21 to $19.24, a 35.4% increase).
32 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding
that a reasonable agency interpretation of a statute is entitled to deference even if it does not
seem to the court to be the best statutory interpretation).
3 Smiley, 517 U.S. 735. The petitioner raised a different constitutional question, concerning
the delegation of federal pre-emption power to the states, that the Court specifically distin-
guished and declined to address: whether the meaning of "interest" could mean one thing for
pre-emption purposes (to activate the permissions of 12 U.S.C. § 85), but could be defined
by the home bank's state law in a different way that had an impact on the scope and effect
of that pre-emption on other states. Id. at 747.
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it did not consider the claim that the regulation authorizes the collection of punitive
damages that are unconstitutionally disproportionate to the underlying damage. 34
The recent ruling in State Farm now brings that issue to the fore.35
B. Why State Farm v. Campbell May Render Legally Enforceable Credit Card
Late Fees Unconstitutional: A Pricis
State Farm v. Campbell invalidated a punitive damages award of $145 million
on the grounds that it was unreasonable and disproportionate relative to the $1 million
compensatory award.36 Mr. Campbell's reckless driving on an interstate highway
caused a crash resulting in the death of one party and the significant injury of another.37
His insurance company, State Farm, refused a $50,000 settlement (representing the
policy limit) on his behalf and decided to contest liability, against its own investigator's
recommendation.38 Despite the company's own findings that Campbell was at fault,
State Farm assured Campbell that it would represent his interests at trial, that Campbell
would not be found liable, that he need not retain separate counsel, and that his assets
were entirely safe.39 Although "State Farm's employees altered the company's records
to make Campbell appear less culpable,"' Campbell nonetheless lost at trial and was
assessed $185,849 in damages. 41 For some time, State Farm refused to pay for any
amount above the $50,000 policy limit and advised Campbell to sell his property and
to move.42 Campbell, in conjunction with the original plaintiffs against him, sued
State Farm for bad faith, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 43 The
jury awarded him $2.6 million in compensatory damages, later reduced to $1 million
by the trial court, and $145 million in punitive damages, which was also reduced by
the trial court to $25 million.44 The punitive damages award of $145 million was later
reinstated by the Utah Supreme Court, after reviewing its size in light of the U.S.
Supreme Court's earlier disproportionality decision in BMW of North America, Inc.
v. Gore.45
14 Smiley, 517 U.S. 735.
: State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
36 Id. at 429.
17 Id. at 412-13.
38 Id. at 413.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 419.
41 Id. at 413.
42 Id. After five years and Campbell's unsuccessful appeal of the wrongful death claims
himself, State Farm eventually paid the full judgment. Id. at 414.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 415.
4' 517 U.S. 559 (1996); see State Farm, 538 U.S. at 415-16 (reviewing the holding of the
Utah Supreme Court).
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The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in a 6-3 decision, overturned the
punitive damages award.' In reaching this result, the Court applied the three criteria
announced in Gore to assess the constitutionality of a punitive damage award: (1)
the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct, (2) the disparity be-
tween the harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award, and (3)
considerations of horizontal equity.47 In its discussion of the second factor, the Court
declined "to impose a bright-line ratio which a punitive damages award cannot
exceed. 48 Nevertheless, one sentence later, it issued a prediction far more specific
than the guidelines offered in prior cases: "Our jurisprudence and the principles it
has now established demonstrate, however, that, in practice, few awards exceeding a
single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree,
will satisfy due process."'49
State Farm has, thus far, mainly been interpreted as articulating a limit on tort
litigation and a shield for the defense. 0 Its potential as an offensive tool on behalf
of consumers has not yet been explored or appreciated. State Farm may serve con-
sumer interests in those contexts in which consumers are levied penalties, i.e., puni-
tive damages, for breach of contract that are significantly disproportionate to the harm
caused by breach, such as credit card late charges.
In brief, the implications of State Farm for credit card late charges are as follows.
The collection of credit card late charges involves the imposition of penalties for con-
tractual breach, namely the failure to render payment by an agreed-upon date. Punitive
damages for contractual breach are typically disallowed by the common law of contract
(and the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)), even when mutually agreed on by both
contracting parties in the form of contractual penalties for breach.5 This bar has been
46 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 411,416,429.
41 Id. at 418 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 575).
48 Id. at 425.
49 Id.
50 See supra note 5.
"' See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1) (1981) ("Damages for breach
by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an amount that is reasonable
in the light of the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach and the difficulties of proof
of loss. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is unenforceable on grounds
of public policy as a penalty."); see also MCA Television Ltd. v. Pub. Interest Corp., 171 F.3d
1265, 1271 (11 th Cir. 1999) ("Unlike tort law, which permits the imposition of punitive damages
as a means to deter disfavored conduct, contract law does not allow for punitive damages unless
the breach of contract is also a tort for which punitive damages are recoverable.... Parties may
not, however, use... stipulated damages provisions as a way to secure for themselves greater
damages in the event of a breach than contract law would normally allow. If a court finds the
damages stipulated to be out of all proportion to the reasonably anticipated loss from nonper-
formance, it will conclude that the provision was intended to impose a penalty for breach.. .. "
(citations omitted)); Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Dearborn Title Corp., 118 F.3d 1157, 1161 (7th
Cir. 1997) (finding that when it was not a "bona fide estimate of the likely damages," a 100%
liquidated damages clause for bounced checks was an unenforceable penalty); Lake River
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specifically applied to penalties for late payment.5 2 Under the common law of contract,
these charges would be unenforceable penalties.5 3 Because the companies make no
attempt to calibrate the late charges to the losses they incur from late payment and be-
cause these charges do not in fact represent even rough approximations of their losses,
absent statutory authorization, the late charge clauses in credit card contracts should
be analyzed as unenforceable penalty clauses that masquerade as liquidated damages
clauses. Credit card late fees have recently become immune from this general rule
Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1290 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding that liquidated
damages clause was a penalty when "[t]he formula... is invariant to the gravity of the
breach"); Thorsen v. Iron & Glass Bank, 476 A.2d 928, 932 (Pa. 1984) ("The law is clear
that punitive damages are not recoverable in an action for breach of contract."); Wolin v.
Walker, 830 P.2d 429,433 (Wyo. 1992) (holding unenforceable liquidated damages that are
"punitive in nature," that is, "when the damages provided bear no reasonable relationship to
the actual damages sustained"); U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (2003) ("Damages for breach by either
party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an amount which is reasonable in the
light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, [and, in a consumer contractJ
the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining
an adequate remedy."); 11 ARTHURLINTON CORBIN, CORBINON CONTRACTS § 1057 (interim
ed. 2002); FARNSWORTH, supra note 25, § 12.18, at 843; JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR.,
MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 125(A)(1) (4th ed. 2001).
52 See, e.g., Ridgley v. Topa Thrift & Loan Ass'n, 953 P.2d 484,490 (Cal. 1998) (finding
that when a loan prepayment charge of six months' interest was contingent upon a late payment,
such a charge was really a penalty for late payment and unenforceable because it was unrelated
to the actual injury suffered from the late payment); Dist. Cablevision Ltd. P'ship v. Bassin,
828 A.2d 714, 725 (D.C. 2003) (affirming jury verdict that when actual loss from a late pay-
ment of a cable television subscription was $2.43, a $5.00 late fee was an unenforceable penalty
under the common law); Graves v. Cupic, 272 P.2d 1020, 1025 (Idaho 1954) (finding contrac-
tually stipulated damages to be a penalty because the amount was arbitrary and bore no rea-
sonable relation to foreseeable damages from contractual breach); Highgate Assocs., Ltd. v.
Merryfield, 597 A.2d 1280 (Vt. 1991) (finding that when the loss from a late rent payment
was readily calculable, the amount of liquidated damages was not reasonably related to the
actual loss sustained as a result of the late payment, and the provision was intended to dis-
courage and not compensate for losses resulting from late payment, liquidated damages clause
in a residential lease was an unenforceable penalty).
" See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1373, 1424-25 (2004).
Bar-Gill argues that late fees are disproportionate to the credit card company's cost and that
this violates the common law prohibition against penalty damages. Id. at 1424. He incorrectly
concludes that they are perforce illegal, ignoring the pre-emptive effect of the NBA, DIDA,
and the exportation of the laws of more permissive states endorsed by Smiley v. Citibank. For
this reason, he incorrectly attributes the reluctance of courts to invalidate late fees on common
law contracts grounds to the difficulty courts would have in "conduct[ing] the comprehensive
analysis of an issuer's cost structure that would be required to separate illegal penalties from
reasonable liquidated damages." Id. at 1425. Because of the pre-emptive effect of NBA and
DIDA, only congressional action, uniform and coordinated legislative action in all fifty states,
or a constitutional challenge of the sort discussed in this Article could reinstate the applica-
bility of the common law doctrine to late fee charges for credit card payments.
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of contract through a combination of state and federal statutes that override these legal
presumptions.14 Although the common law and statutory presumptions against con-
tractual penalty damages may be overridden or modified by another statute, any statute
that authorizes the imposition of punitive damages must still meet constitutional limits.
No statute may authorize legally enforceable punitive damages that are excessively
disproportionate to the underlying loss. Disproportionately high damages violate the
constitutional constraints freshly specified by State Farm.
State Farm directed that punitive damages should not exceed nine times the
amount of the actual losses sustained by the plaintiff.55 The federal and state statutes
that override the common law presumption against contractual penalties have autho-
rized levying and enforcing penalty damages that transgress this guideline. Most major
credit card companies impose penalty charges for late payment that range from $15
to $39.56 These penalties may be assessed even when payment is only an hour 7 or
a day overdue and even if the balance is quite low, sometimes lower than the fee
assessed. As is argued at greater length in Part III, these charges exceed the costs
credit card companies incur by a factor that typically far surpasses the 9:1 State Farm
ratio. 58 Nor does the situation giving rise to these damages have features that meet
the conditions that State Farm recognized as exceptional, features that might justify
a departure from the 9:1 upper limit.59 Therefore, governmental authorization and
enforcement of such late charges violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
In the following Parts, this argument will be unpacked in stages. First, it will be
argued that State Farm applies to this aspect of contract law and to legislative autho-
rizations of penalty damages. Then, an extended argument will be offered to support
the contention that state and federal statutes and regulations authorize the enforcement
of penalties for breach of contract that violate the constitutional constraints on punitive
damages articulated in State Farm. This challenge does not involve revisiting the
statutory interpretation question resolved by Smiley,60 although the argument of this
Article has implications for the regulation considered in Smiley. As applied, either
the exportation regulations interpreted in Smiley in conjunction with relevant state
statutes are unconstitutional for reasons not considered by the Smiley Court, or, in the
alternative, the exportation regulation of the NBA (and its analogous counterpart in
54 See supra text accompanying notes 25-29.
5' State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).
56 See U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABIrY OFFICE, supra note 8, at 20 (calculating that
the average late fee charged in 2005 was about $37); see also supra notes 8-9 and accom-
panying text.
" Cf. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1104 (Cal. 2005) (discussing
Discover Bank's practice of assessing late fees if payment was received after 1:00 p.m. on
the due date).
5 See infra Part Inl.
5 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425.
6 Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735 (1996).
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DIDA) should be interpreted as implicitly incorporating restraints on the size of per-
missible late fees to avoid the constitutional question. In either case, these penalty
charges should be declared invalid because they are disproportionately large punitive
damages, because the applicable common law in the absence of the statute would void
them as penalties for mere contractual breach, and in some cases, because the other-
wise applicable statutory law would invalidate them as usury or unauthorized charges.6
]I. THE APPLICATION OF STATE FARM TO THE CREDIT CARD CONTEXT
To pursue the argument sketched in Part I, two preliminary issues must be ad-
dressed about the extension of State Farm to credit card late fees. First, State Farm
arose in the tort context, not the contracts context.62 Some may suggest that the
State Farm protections do not clearly extend to contractors. Second, the State Farm
constraint arose with respect to jury assessments, not statutes.63 This Part investigates
State Farm's implications in contexts other than jury awards pursuant to tort actions.
It argues that State Farm limits the penalties legislatures may levy, and that legis-
latures may authorize private parties to levy in a variety of situations, in a variety of
other contexts.
A. Does State Farm Apply to the Contracts Context?
One may question whether State Farm limits apply to the credit card context be-
cause the line of cases giving rise to the constitutional limitation on punitive damages
had tortfeasors in mind, not contractors. Actually, State Farm v. Campbell,64 BMW
of North America v. Gore,65 and Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group,
Inc.6 were all hybrid cases that involved elements of contract and tort. The bad faith
6' For example, Massachusetts's law authorizes creditors of open-end credit accounts to
levy late charges no greater than $10 or ten percent of the outstanding balance, whichever is
less. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 114B (2006). Maine's statute authorizes creditors, after
fifteen days of delinquency, to assess either late charges of five percent of the outstanding
balance, not to exceed $10 or a highly regulated deferral charge. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A,
§ 2-502(1) (2005). For cards that do not charge annual fees, Minnesota permits "delinquency
and collection" charges after ten days in arrears for five percent or $5, whichever is greater,
plus capped attorney's fees if an attorney is hired for collection purposes. MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 48.185(4)(d)(1) (West 2005) (incorporating ceiling from MINN. STAT. ANN. § 168.71(c)
(West 2005)). California sets limits on late fees depending on how long the account has been
in arrears. See CAL. FIN. CODE § 4001 (West 1999); see also infra notes 184-96 and accom-
panying text.
62 See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 413.
63 See id.
6 538 U.S. 408.
65 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
66 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
[Vol. 15:457
ARE CREDIT CARD LATE FEES UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
and fraud in State Farm arose within an effort to evade payment on an insurance con-
tract. 67 Gore involved a failure to disclose minor damage and prior repair in a sales
68 6context. Cooper Industries concerned fraudulent advertising.' Still, in these cases,
the punitive damages arose from the tortious element of the conduct.
The focus on tortfeasors in the jurisprudence and commentary on punitive dam-
ages does not mean that punitive damages assessed in contract are exempt from the
standards articulated in State Farm. Lower courts have applied the State Farm frame-
work to other causes of action, including § 1983 actions, copyright, and unauthorized
credit card charges.70 The Supreme Court's specific mention of tortfeasors was natural
because tort cases are the common civil context in which punitive damages are as-
sessed. Given the general ban on punitive damages in contract, 71 it would have been
peculiar for the Court to mention explicitly the applicability of these standards to the
contracts context.
This natural focus on tort law does not carry greater import, however. In par-
ticular, it does not suggest that the State Farm protection does not extend to contractors.
If anything, the standards governing punitive damages in contract should be stricter
than they are in torts, both because punitive damages awarded in tort actions are more
traditional and because they are consequent to clear and serious wrongdoing. By con-
trast, late fees are triggered by actions (late payments) that the law typically does not
regard as a serious form of wrongdoing but rather as merely contractual breach.72 It
would be perverse if a substantive due process protection extended to tortfeasors who
had engaged in serious wrongdoing but did not protect contractors whose wrong was
rather slight.
Yet, it might be argued that punitive damages in contract differ because contracts
(and the late fee agreements in them) involve voluntary, private relationships. This
fact has questionable significance. Although their victims have not typically entered
into a voluntary relationship, tortfeasors---the ones subject to punitive damages-have
often acted voluntarily. Their voluntary behavior and their knowledge that it may
67 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 413-14.
68 Gore, 517 U.S. at 563-64.
69 Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 428.
70 See Siggers-El v. Barlow, 433 F. Supp. 2d 811, 817-18 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (applying
State Farm framework in case alleging § 1983 violation for retaliation against use of First
Amendment rights); Lowry's Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 455, 460
(D. Md. 2004) (finding State Farm disproportionality analysis applicable in a copyright cause
of action, although finding no violation); Votto v. Am. Car Rental, Inc., No. CV0 10456354S,
2003 WL 21716003, at *4-5 (Conn. Super. June 16,2003) (applying State Farm framework
to case involving unauthorized credit card charges and violation of Connecticut Unfair
Trade Practice Act).
7' See infra note 143 and accompanying text and supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
72 See supra text accompanying notes 25-26; see also Seana Shiffrin, The Divergence
of Contract and Promise, 113 HARv. L. REv. 708 (2007) (discussing contract law's attitude
toward breach as reflected in its stance on punitive damages).
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subject them to punitive damages does not exempt them from the constitutional pro-
tections afforded by the State Farm line of cases. As is illustrated by the treatment of
voluntary behavior by tortfeasors who are aware of their susceptibility to punitive
damages, what matters from the constitutional point of view in assessing the constitu-
tionality of punitive damages is not whether the conduct subject to punitive damages
is knowing and voluntary; what matters is how the state treats this voluntary conduct
and whether it authorizes and enforces punishments that are disproportionate to the
losses imposed by the behavior.
Still, it might be argued that torts involve public wrongs and that punitive damages
represent official state recognition and reaction to this public wrong. The constitutional
limitations articulated in State Farm govern the governmental reaction to this public
wrong. Contractual breach, by contrast, is not standardly considered a public wrong.
7 3
Punitive damage agreements within contracts, when allowed at all, merely represent
an agreement between private parties and do not represent or emerge from the state's
recognition of and reaction to a public wrong. Hence, State Farm's limits on the state's
imposition of punitive damages are inapt in this context.
Against this objection, it might be pressed that the state does not merely allow
these private arrangements but takes an active role in enforcing them. This enforcement
role in turn permeates and motivates the background environment of voluntary com-
pliance. Some, however, may object that this degree of state involvement with volun-
tary agreements, so described, is sufficiently neutral and pale as to render it different
in kind from its enforcement activity in the torts domain. Considerations of this kind
may lend credence to the position that at least some elements of contract doctrine
should not be subject to the same constitutional scrutiny that might be apposite in
other domains of law.74
The case of credit card late fees, however, has special features that implicate the
state to a greater degree than is captured by the standard story of contract as a purely
private relation.75 First, credit card transactions are not sui generis private arrange-
ments but are an aspect of the highly regulated banking industry meant to serve national
purposes and to underwrite the national economic system.76 Second, as previously
3 See Shiffrin, supra note 72.
7 See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Religious Law and Civil Law: Using Secular Law to Assure
Observance of Practices with Religious Significance, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 781,817-18 (1998)
(discussing state enforcement of civil contracts that have religious significance and require
actions with religious significance); cf. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979) (holding that the
Establishment Clause did not bar a court from resolving a property dispute between churches
so long as neutral principles of law were invoked and not interpretation of internal church
doctrine).
15 Further related considerations addressing the state action dimensions of this concern
are offered in Part IV.
76 See Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299,314-18 (1978).
In upholding the exportation doctrine with respect to interest rates, the Court made extensive
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mentioned, punitive damages in contract are typically disallowed by the common law
(and the UCC).77 The bar is so strong that private parties are not usually permitted to
contract around this remedies rule; liquidated damage agreements that contain penalties
are invalidated. This strong default presumption has been overcome in the case of
credit card late fees, not by any general evolution in the common law but by affirmative
78Sttanlegislative action. State and federal legislatures enacted statutes and regulations to
overcome the standard ban against punitive damages and punitive damage agreements
for contractual breach in order to facilitate the business of banks, to attract their busi-
ness to particular states, and in the case of the NBA, to promote nationally-chartered
banks.79 The government's aim was to remove the hindrances posed by state common
law and state consumer protection law so as to facilitate the use of late fees.
In light of this history, the governmental stance cannot be properly understood as
that of a neutral observer. Instead, through legislative and agency activity, the govern-
ment has actively endorsed and encouraged the use of credit card late fees, a specific
sort of punitive damage agreement. 80 Its actions in support of such punitive dam-
ages, through authorization meant to encourage and facilitate their imposition, and also
through the promise of enforcement, are therefore properly subject to the standards
articulated in State Farm.
B. Does State Farm Apply to Legislative Action?
State Farm capped a line of cases that assessed the validity of jury impositions
of large punitive damage assessments.81 Although the Court was prompted in some
measure by specific concerns about the arbitrariness of jury awards, the vagaries of
jury deliberation, and variations between cases,82 the holding of State Farm cannot be
limited to the context of jury awards. The underlying issue in the line of cases culmi-
nating in State Farm is not how a certain agent, namely the jury, calculates punitive
damages. If the issue exclusively concerned the agent who imposed damages and how
appeal to the significance of the national banking system to the economy and the intention
behind the NBA and § 85 to facilitate a national banking system and regional interdepen-
dence. Id.
7 See supra text accompanying notes 51-54.
78 See supra text accompanying notes 25-31.
'9 In BeneficialNationalBank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2003), the Court described §§ 85-86
of the NBA as allowing for uniform rules for national banks that provide "an integral part of
a banking system that needed protection from 'possible unfriendly State legislation."' Id. at
10; see also supra Part I.A.
80 Cf. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (finding California referendum repealing
law against private discrimination did not merely permit private discrimination but, in context,
encouraged it, and therefore, was subject to constitutional review).
81 See, e.g., supra note 2 and accompanying text.
82 State Farm v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417-18 (2003).
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they were determined, the matter would sound exclusively in procedural due process,
but it does not, as the Court recognized.83
Rather, the central issue is how harshly civil wrongs may be punished. Substan-
tive due process requires legally cognizable punishments and penalties to bear a pro-
portionate relationship to the underlying wrong.8 Whether arrived through settlements,
through the agency of a judge, through the agency of a jury, or through the agency of
the legislature, punitive damages for a civil wrong must not be disproportionately
large relative to the wrong at issue.
A few thought experiments help to illustrate this claim. First, judge-awarded
punitive damages must be subject to the same strictures. It defies credulity to think
that, after State Farm, a judge could directly award the same level of punitive dam-
ages relative to compensatory damages that were invalidated when provided by a
jury. Furthermore, it is dubitable that a judge could approve a settlement agree-
ment in a class action suit that explicitly included an agreement for punitive damages
just like the one invalidated in State Farm.86 If so, it is highly significant to the case
at hand. Credit card late fee agreements are agreements to pay punitive damages that
are not only explicitly authorized by legislatures but also expected to be judicially
enforced against those who do not pay them. In this latter respect, they resemble
settlement agreements.
Just as it seems settlement agreements cannot circumvent State Farm's strictures,
it is likewise illegitimate for a legislature, whether federal or state, to attempt to override
the State Farm ruling through a statute that explicitly authorized the very same amount
of punitive damages relative to compensatory damages. Nor does it seem compatible
with the holding and reasoning of State Farm for a legislature to pass a statute explic-
itly authorizing another agent to set and enforce punitive damage awards that were
unconstrained and had no upper boundaries. Likewise, a legislature could not cure the
defects of unconstrained jury awards merely by passing a statute explicitly providing
juries authorization to award whatever punitive damages they thought appropriate.87
83 Id. at 422-23.
84 Id.
85 Three cases, one unreported, scrutinize judge-awarded punitive damages for compli-
ance with State Farm. None portray any difference between the application of State Farm
to the judge-awarded damages and to jury-awarded damages; in each case, however, the awards
passed muster. See In re Wright, No. SA-03-CV-932, 2004 WL 569517, at *8 n.60 (W.D.
Tex. Mar. 8,2004) (holding that bankruptcy judge awarded punitive damages in accord with
State Farm); Austin v. Specialty Transp. Servs., Inc., 594 S.E.2d 867, 877 (S.C. App. 2004)
(directly applying State Farm to judge-awarded punitive damages but finding award met
single digit multiplier rule); Bright v Addison, 171 S.W.3d 588,603-05 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005)
(assessing punitive damages awarded in bench trial for compliance with State Farm).
86 Cf. O'Flaherty v. Belgum, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 286,335-36 (Ct. App. 2004) (declaring that
de novo standard of review for punitive damages does not apply to arbitration awards but also
noting, in dicta, that arbitration award met State Farm's substantive standards).
87 "The Gore guideposts may apply to punitive damages awards under federal statutes."
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The State Farm Court's concern was not merely with horizontal equity or the
unpredictability of juries; only the third factor of the Court's test, the one pertaining
to horizontal equity, refers specifically to juries and the relative size of the awards they
generate.8" The other two factors, reprehensibility and size relative to compensatory
damages, should equally govern legislative authorizations of punitive damages. Indeed,
the Court explicitly emphasized that while "[sitates possess discretion over the impo-
sition of punitive [damages]," that discretion is limited by procedural and substantive
constitutional limits.89 Indeed, the Supreme Court drew the connection itself. In its
discussion of the substantive upper limit on punitive damage awards, it drew on the
history of legislative enactments of double and treble damages as examples of per-
missible authorizations of penalties.90 Not only did the Court articulate the consti-
tutional constraint in terms of the agency of the states and not merely that of juries, but
its articulation of the substantive due process concern would apply equally to other
state actors.9' Grossly excessive awards, the Court reasoned, "further[] no legitimate
purpose and constitute[] an arbitrary deprivation of property." 92 The context of the
decision-that it was a jury award-heightened but was not the crux of the concern
in State Farm.93 A substantive constitutional objection to a penalty cannot arise only
when that penalty is imposed by a jury. Substantive constitutional restrictions must
be respected by juries, judges, legislatures, and executives alike.
True, one of State Farm's objections was procedural, dealing with the absence of
fair notice of the size of the penalty that might be imposed for wrongful conduct.94
This procedural concern, addressed by the horizontal equity factor mentioned above,
often has special force against jury awards. This consideration might well be overcome
if a statute carefully delineated a narrowly constrained penalty range applicable in
response to wrongful conduct.95 The legislative authorization of credit card late fees
Lowry's Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 455,460 (D. Md. 2004) (citing
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424,430 n.3 (2001)); see also
St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66-67 (1919) (holding that
statutorily imposed penalties that are "wholly disproportioned to the offense and obviously
unreasonable" violate substantive due process) (cited in BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517
U.S. 559, 575 (1996)); Parker v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 331 F.3d 13, 22 (2d Cir. 2003)
(contemplating application of State Farm in case involving violation of privacy provisions
of the Cable Communications Act but not reaching the issue).
88 See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 418.
89 Id. at 416 (emphasis added).
90 Id. at 425.
9' Cf id. (noting that complying with due process through single-digit multipliers of punitive
awards would "still achiev[e] the State's goals of... retribution"(emphasis added)).
92 Id. at 417.
9' See id. at417-18.
94 Id. at 417.
9' See Lowry's Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 455,460 (D. Md. 2004)
(affirming punitive damages award for copyright violation when punitive damages were based
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is not, however, so constrained. The relevant state statutes, NBA, and DIDA neither
define a range of permissible penalties nor demand that the penalty size be responsive
to the underlying harm caused by breach. Rather, the statutes that the NBA and DIDA
select as the governing law simply authorize the banks to charge what they wish96
so long as there is disclosure to the customer.97
The requirement of disclosure of the late fee and the uniform application of the
late fee to all customers of a particular card partly, but do not fully, allay the procedural
concerns. Forms of legislative authorization that provide no guidelines for the size
of the appropriate fee permit private agents who are not accountable to the public to
determine the size of legally enforceable penalties and to vary them at will provided
they disclose the fee to consumers. One should not overestimate the significance of this
disclosure. Many cardpayers do not read the long print of their credit card agreements
whose text does not easily submit to comprehension in any case.98 Fewer still read the
updates and amendments that arrive in the mail. Further, many cardpayers significantly
discount the likelihood that they will be subject to a late penalty. Many consumers are
surprised by the size and conditions of the fee, and their ignorance suggests that they
do not force sharper market competition."
Moreover, the penalties announced need not bear a close relationship to the harm
caused by breach nor need they manifest horizontal equity with penalties assessed by
other companies for similar forms of breach. Competition between credit cards might
generate some forms of horizontal equity in late fees between credit cards if the notice
were sufficiently transparent and salient to consumers. Market competition would not
be likely, however, to generate horizontal equity in penalties for late payment between
non-competing companies, such as those for credit cards and cell phones, although the
wrong of late payments is the same. If the heart of the procedural concern about jury
awards is that they are not accountable and not responsive to considerations of hori-
zontal equity, these concerns largely hold true of the broad and limitless legislative
authorizations to private companies to levy enforceable penalties.
on statutory authorization from a "carefully crafted and reasonably constrained statute" and
when compensatory losses were difficult to measure); see also infra note 132.
96 See, for example, the South Dakota statute at issue in Citibank, which provides no guide-
lines about the size of charges. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 54-3-1, -1.1 (2006). It explicitly
states there is no maximum to what may be charged. Id. § 54-3-1.1.
17 See Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1637(c)(1)(B)(ii) (2000) (requiring "clear[] and
conspicuous[]" disclosure of late fees, defined as "[a]ny fee imposed for a late payment").
98 See U.S. GOVERNMENT AccOuNTABITY OFFICE, supra note 8, at 51. The Government
Accountability Office found that "the disclosures in the customer solicitation materials and
cardmember agreements provided by four of the largest credit card issuers were too compli-
cated for many consumers to understand." Id. at 6.
9 "Most people never anticipate they will pay late, so they do not shop around for better
late fees." Robin Stein, The Ascendancy of the Credit Card Industry, FRONTLINE, Nov. 23,
2004, http://www.pbs.orglwgbhlpages/frontline/shows/credit/more/rise.html.
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I. ARE CREDIT CARD LATE CHARGES PUNITIVE DAMAGES THAT WOULD
TRANSGRESS STATE FARM'S CONSTRAINTS?
As a matter of statutory interpretation, Smiley v. Citibank'°° clearly affirmed the
comptroller's regulation under the NBA. That regulation authorized nationally-
chartered credit card companies to rely on their home state law to levy charges autho-
rized by their home state statutes.' The issuers' home state statutes overrode the
default contract rule invalidating penalty charges as well as any other relevant con-
sumer protection statutes from the consumer's home state. Smiley only addressed the
interpretative question of whether late charges were "interest" in the context of the
statutory scheme. 2 It did not address whether a statutory scheme encouraging the
unconstrained assessment of punitive damages in contract satisfied constitutional limits
on punitive damages. State Farm calls into question whether this statutory blanket
exemption meets constitutional standards. This Part applies the State Farm constitu-
tional standards in greater detail to the legal framework facilitating the imposition of
late fees.
A. Applying State Farm's Three-Factor Test
State Farm explicitly recognized both procedural and substantive limitations on
punitive damages awards.0 3 Elaborating upon its prior decision in BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore,'° the Court articulated three factors to review punitive damages
for constitutional soundness: (1) the reprehensibility of the conduct giving rise to
the punitive damages; (2) disparity between the actual loss suffered and the punitive
damages; and (3) "the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury
and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases."'0 5 As the Court
declared, these factors need not all be present to render a damage award unconstitu-
tional. "The existence of any one of these factors weighing in favor of a plaintiff may
not be sufficient to sustain a punitive damages award; and the absence of all of them
renders any award suspect."'" Applying these factors to credit card late charges casts
doubt upon their constitutionality.
'00 517 U.S. 735 (1996).
101 Id. at 744-47.
102 Id. at 745.
103 "While States possess discretion over the imposition of punitive damages, it is well estab-
lished that there are procedural and substantive constitutional limitations on these awards."
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003).
104 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
'05 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 418 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 575).
106 Id. at 419.
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1. Reprehensibility
The Court has identified reprehensibility as the most important factor in a puni-
tive damages analysis.1 7 In the case of late payments on credit card bills, there is rarely
any reprehensible wrongdoing involved in merely making a late payment. In any
case, the imposition of late charges does not follow any particularized effort to assess
whether the consumer has engaged in any culpable behavior. Even the transparently
bad faith behavior of the State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company was
nevertheless thought to be consistent with invalidating the punitive damages levied
against it.'° 8 If the degree of reprehensibility involved is, as the Court states, the "most
important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award,"' ° then it is
difficult to see how credit card late charges of current magnitudes can be reasonable.
Running down the Court's articulated subfactors, the harm of late payment is eco-
nomic as opposed to physical; it does not evince indifference or disregard for the
health or safety of others; the target is not financially vulnerable; and, in many cases,
the conduct may be isolated." 0 Finally, the harm, whether understood as the tardiness
or the costs associated with the tardiness, is rarely the result of malice, trickery, or
deceit by the late payer."' Many late payers are poorly organized, negligent, or just
strapped for cash. Few are attempting to hobble the credit card companies. Some late
payers may be playing the float and attempting to keep money owed as long as possible
in their own accounts for interest and other purposes. They may miscalculate the opti-
mal time to send payment to make it just on time. But it is questionable whether this
107 Id. (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 575).
108 Part of the Court's concern in State Farm was that the size of the penalty might have
reflected evidence of the company's pattern of avoiding settlements through like practices.
Id. at 422-23. The Court objected to the introduction of evidence of State Farm's practices, both
legal and illegal, in other states on the grounds that penalizing practices in other states was be-
yond Utah's jurisdiction. Id. at 421-23. It further criticized basing penalty assessments on in-
sufficient evidence of the defendant's actions towards other parties (even in-state) as well as
on the defendant's other, dissimilar forms of malfeasance. Id.
"9 Id. at 419 (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 575).
110 Id.
.' Compare the discussion of reprehensibility in Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 127 P.3d
1165 (Or. 2006), cert. granted in part, 126 S. Ct. 2329 (2006). To justify a punitive damage
award exceeding State Farm guidelines, the Oregon Supreme Court noted that "[o]f the five
reprehensibility factors listed in Gore .... four certainly are met here." Id. at 1177 (em-
phasis added) (finding the harm was physical, defendants showed indifference and reckless
disregard for their victims, the behavior was not isolated, and the behavior was not accidental
because trickery and deceit were involved, but not finding that the victims were financially
vulnerable). The Oregon opinion stressed the physical harms of smoking on the plaintiff and
the defendant's decades-long misconduct involving "trickery and deceit." Id. Whether even
this level of reprehensibility justifies a departure is at issue in the current case pending at the
Supreme Court. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at I., Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 126
S. Ct. 2329 (2006) (No. 05-1256), available at 2006 WL 849860.
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effort and the miscalculation of its limits rise to the level of reprehensible, intentional
wrongdoing. Of course, a small minority may be evading payment entirely. Perhaps
their conduct is reprehensible. The current practice of late charges, however, does
not distinguish between these categories of late payers. Late charges are typically
assessed without any particularized effort to assess the purposes or quality of the late
payer's breach, by looking for instance at the length of delay or the pattern or history
of like behavior.
2. Disparity Between Compensatory and Punitive Damages
Second, there is an enormous disparity between the actual loss suffered by the
credit card company for late payments and the late charges it imposes. While the Court
declined "to impose a bright-line ratio which a punitive damages award cannot ex-
ceed," in the past, it regarded 4:1 ratios as coming "close to the line of constitutional
impropriety."1 12 It cautioned that "[o]ur jurisprudence and the principles it has now
established demonstrate... that, in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio
between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due
process."1 3 Many credit card late charges may reasonably be thought to exceed the
company's actual costs by a multiple of greater than ten. "
4
Why "ten" rather than "nine"? State Farm regards punitive damages in excess
of a nine-digit multiplier of actual losses as constitutionally suspect."5 Suppose the
late charge represents an effort to recoup some losses from late payments. If that
charge exceeds the amount of actual losses, it is only the excess that serves as a penalty.
That is, taking the credit card company's best arguments into account, the late charge
should be analyzed as an amalgam of compensatory damages and punitive damages.
Most compensatory damages are already supplied by the interest charged on outstand-
ing principal, which compensates for the lost-time value of money. But suppose there
are further losses associated with the late payment that are not addressed by that interest
rate. To assess what part of the late fee may run afoul of State Farm, one should sub-
tract the actual loss from the late charge and then assess whether the excess exceeds
the actual loss by a factor greater than nine or, in other words, assess whether the entire
late charge exceeds the actual loss by a factor greater than ten.
Most credit card late charges cannot represent realistic approximations of the losses
sustained by credit card companies for late payments. Although discovery would be
required to substantiate fully that claim, it defies credibility to imagine that infor-
mation could be supplied to render it credible that credit card companies suffer $15
to $39 worth of losses from the range of late payments that evoke these fees. Credit
card companies recoup the lost-time value of the money from tardiness through the
"2 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425.
113 id.
" See infra text accompanying notes 116-27.
"5 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425.
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interest charged on the outstanding balance. Indeed, late payments also often prompt
credit card companies to increase substantially the interest rate they charge on out-
standing balances, further insuring compensation for the lost-time value of the money
as well as other expenses incurred." 6
It might be thought that the late charges represent an effort to recoup further costs
associated with collection efforts, but there are significant difficulties with this sug-
gestion. In many states, collection costs are often independently recoverable, especially
for those individuals whose account is referred to an attorney or a collection agency." 7
Bankruptcy courts disallow secured creditors to collect both default interest rates and
late fees, on the grounds that collecting both would be a form of double charging."'
As one court put it, the interest charge is "reasonable compensation, but a second
charge [(the late fee)] ... is a penalty and not reasonable.""' 9
Putting aside the issue of double charging, the late charge far exceeds the collection
costs, if there are any at all, in most cases. 20 Usually, the only action the credit card
..6 See McGeehan, supra note 8; see also U.S. GOVERNMENT AccOuNTABILrrY OFFICE,
supra note 8, at 24 (reporting that late payments often trigger higher "penalty" interest rates
on the entire balance that may exceed thirty percent and that may be in force for six months
or more); Cardweb.com, Card Changes (Mar. 18, 2005), http://www.cardweb.com/cardtrak/
news/2005/march/1 8a.html (discussing reactions of major credit card companies to late pay-
ments in addition to late charges, including the discontinuation of promotional rates, the impo-
sition of higher cash advance rates, and the general imposition of interest rates over twenty
percent for outstanding balances and future charges).
".. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 48.185(4)(d)(1) (West 2002) (incorporating ceiling from
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 168.7 1(c) (West 2002) (permitting attorney's fees in addition to restricted
late charges when an attorney is hired for collection purposes)); 7 PA. STAT. ANN. § 322(d)(v)
(West 1994) (authorizing creditors to recover collection costs in addition to late penalties not
to exceed $20 or ten percent of outstanding balance); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-26.1-10 (2004)
(authorizing creditors to recover collection costs for referred accounts); see also Geoffrey
L. Berman & Peter M. Gilhuly, Recovering Attorneys' Fees and Costs in Bankruptcy Cases,
19 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 32, 32-33 (2000) (stating that the majority rule in bankruptcy is that
attorneys' fees and collection costs are recoverable for both secured creditors and unsecured
creditors if based on contract enforceable under state law and citing cases involving New
York, Tennessee, and Florida). See generally James Chareq & Anne Fortney, An Argument
for Retaining the Uniform Commercial Code, 51 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 315, 320-21 &
nn.43-50 (1997) (detailing states where collection costs are recoverable and where not).
11' See In re Dixon, 228 B.R. 166, 177 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1998) ("[T]he case law is settled
[that] 'oversecured creditors may receive payment of either default interest or late charges,
but not both."' (citation omitted)); In re Vest Assocs., 217 B.R. 696, 701 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1998) (reporting as "uniform" law that oversecured creditors may not collect both default
interest and late charges); In re Consol. Props. Ltd. P'ship, 152 B.R. 452, 458 (Bankr. D.
Md. 1993).
"' In re Consol. Props., 152 B.R. at 458.
20 In United Cable Television ofBaltimore Ltd. Partnership v. Burch, 732 A.2d 887 (Md.
1999), superseded by statute, MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-1315(f)(i)(1) (LexisNexis
2003), as recognized in Plein v. Dep't of Labor, 800 A.2d 757 (Md. 2002), a late fee of $5 on
a late cable bill payment was invalidated as a penalty charge. Id. at 887. The trial court heard
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company takes is to print the late charges on the next statement. The company takes
virtually no action to collect the payment that is late and often does not need to, as
when payment is merely delayed. For payments that are an hour to a couple of days
late, credit card companies are unlikely to take any action at all. Their only costs are
the lost-time value of the money, which is already compensated for by the (typically
very high) interest rate on the balance.' For this class of late payments, the late fee
is purely punitive. It not only exceeds actual losses but exceeds them by far more
than the 9:1 ratio outlined in State Farm. In such cases, the penalty would represent
punitive damages in excess of a 100:1 ratio to compensatory damages.
Even in those cases in which the company does take some action to collect, the late
fee often represents a disproportionate charge that exceeds the State Farm guidelines.
Consider the range of possibilities. A longer period of delinquency may prompt the
company to make a call or generate a letter. These activities, of course, do not cost
much. They certainly do not cost the company $39 or even $15. Under standard con-
tract law, the charge would represent an unenforceable penalty.'22 The letter will be
computer generated. It will cost the company very little above the cost of postage,
paper, ink, and the marginal cost of the development and operation of the computer
program. Suppose that cost rises to $1. If State Farm's 9:1 ratio applies, even the
lesser $15 penalty would exceed the ratio quite handily. Suppose a phone call occurs.
Such calls typically result in messages or short conversations. Assuming the company
pays their operators the federal minimum wage, a twelve-minute conversation urging
payment (a generous temporal assumption) would represent $1.03 in labor costs.
Suppose the costs associated with phone equipment, the computer dialing program,
and supplies are factored in to the equation. Even if that were to raise the price to
detailed evidence from economists and concluded that a reasonable approximation of the costs
incurred by the company from late payments would not exceed 50¢ a month. See id. at 891.
The collection efforts taken by the cable company were more extensive than those typically
undertaken by credit card companies. The appellate court upheld the trial court's finding but
also expressed skepticism whether anything above simple interest, including collection costs,
could be included at all within the components of valid liquidated damages and that the interest
charged could not exceed Maryland's constitutional cap of six percent. See id. at 891-902.
United Cable's result was repealed by a state statute that permits the imposition of late charges
in consumer contracts for the greater of $5 or ten percent of the amount past due and that
declares such charges are not liquidated damages or penalties. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW
§ 14-1315(f)(i)(1) (LexisNexis 2003).
121 See U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 8, at 24 (reporting that
most accounts charge interest rates under fifteen percent but that in addition to late fees, late
payments trigger higher "penalty" interest rates that may exceed thirty percent and that may
be in force for six months or more); see also Statistical Release, Federal Reserve, Consumer
Credit (Nov. 7,2006), http ://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/current/g19.pdf (reporting
the average annual percentage rate in 2005 for credit cards at commercial banks was 14.54%
for all accounts against which finance charges were assessed).
122 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 25, § 12.8, at 787.
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$1.50 per call, this would still represent a 26:1 ratio if the late charge is $39. So long
as the late charge exceeds $15, the State Farm stricture would be violated.
Even many cases that involve multiple phone calls and letters will still fail to repre-
sent collection costs that are one-tenth the size of those late charges that run to $30 or
more. At some point, of course, the collection costs may rise to a level that would be
unenforceable under ordinary contract law, but the statutory authorization of which
would not run afoul of the ceiling imposed by State Farm.2 3 It is difficult to know
exactly where this line falls without information from the credit card companies about
their actual collection costs. Still, one may safely surmise that there is a massive class
of people who have paid late charges within at least the first month of their being past
due on their accounts and for whom the late fee represents more than 1,000% of the
actual costs to the credit card company. This is likely to represent a great deal of
money. Using a conservative estimate of the revenue credit card companies collect
from late fees, if even a hundredth of that figure represents late fees violating the State
Farm strictures, for one year alone it would represent at least $73 million in punitive
damages whose authorizing legal authority is subject to constitutional challenge. 24
The one exception the Court contemplated to the single-digit guideline does not
fit the circumstances of credit card late penalties-namely, those cases in which "a
particularly egregious act" results in only minimal economic damages. 21 While the
economic damages incurred by credit card companies from late payments are small,
the cause is not an egregious act, much less a particularly egregious act. Further-
more, unlike some of the situations punitive damages are meant to address, the com-
prehensive difficulties of detection and enforcement of the compensatory harm are
absent.126 Credit card companies have the power and resources to easily detect every
particular case of breach and to initiate targeted collection efforts (although they may
face other enforcement difficulties).
It might be objected that the methodologyjust rehearsed is inapt. Instead of asking
the size of collection costs in a single case and that figure's relationship to the late
fee, one should instead consider the general collection costs the industry faces and
then perhaps the costs of default, and assess their relationship to the general system
of charging late fees, the average size of which is $27.46.127 This suggested method-
ology does not, however, fit the constitutional framework imposed by State Farm and
its predecessors. State Farm required a fairly particularized analysis of how the im-
posed penalty related to the particular wrongful action perpetrated by the insurance
123 The third factor in the test used in State Farm acknowledges authorized civil penalties.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418, 428 (2003).
124 See Cardweb.com, Late Fee Bug, supra note 12. The overall revenue companies collect
for penalty fees (late fees and overlimit fees combined) has risen; this figure may be substan-
tially higher. See supra note 12. And, as I argue in the text, it is likely that substantially more
than a hundredth of these fees, and perhaps all of them, exceed State Farm strictures.
125 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425.
126 Cf supra note 5 and accompanying text.
127 See 2005 Credit Card Survey, supra note 9, at 2.
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company. For both reasons of federalism and, independently, "more fundamental" due
process, the decision expressly disallowed any court to take into account in setting the
size of the penalty the insurance company's behavior in other states and the costs this
behavior imposed on consumers and other companies more broadly.'28 If, on due
process grounds, the very same company's behavior cannot be taken into account to
justify punitive damages in excess of the 9:1 ratio, then surely other parties' behavior
cannot be taken into account to justify disproportionate damages. The Court's recent
jurisprudence rules out this sort of aggregative, systematic approach.
Moreover, the costs credit card companies incur for collection actions and for
defaulters lie substantially within their control. Credit card companies have been
permissive, some might say promiscuous, in extending credit to vulnerable, fragile
borrowers. 9 Given the Court's insistence that punitive damages be a response to
the actual wrong done by the defendant and not a surcharge to recoup more systematic
costs imposed by the general behavior of the defendant or other similar parties, the
appropriate question to ask is whether, in particular circumstances, the late fee is a dis-
proportionate punitive measure relative to the specific costs imposed by a particular
late payment.
3. Horizontal Equity
The third factor to consider is the disparity between the penalty and the "civil
penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases."' 13 If the concern is with hori-
zontal equity across particular cases of credit card late fees, credit card late charges may
not run afoul of this guidepost. They are applied across the board as a matter of policy
by the company.
But if the comparison is made to penalties authorized in similar situations, then the
disparity is great. Most other forms of penalty damages in contract are disallowed.' 3'
Other statutorily permitted late charges are usually accompanied by carefully delineated
size and time limitations. They do not involve, as credit card late fees do, blanket and
unconstrained authorizations for powerful private parties to set the size of the penalty
through contracts of adhesion.1
32
128 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 422-24 ("A defendant should be punished for the conduct that
harmed the plaintiff, not for being an unsavory individual or business. Due process does not
permit courts, in the calculation of punitive damages, to adjudicate the merits of other parties'
hypothetical claims against a defendant under the guise of the reprehensibility analysis. ...").
129 See WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 12, at 139.
130 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 428 (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,575
(1996)).
'.. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 25, § 12.8, at 787.
132 Many states permit penalties for late mortgage payments, but the penalties are explicitly
constrained in size. Many statutes also institute a significant grace period before late penalties
may be assessed. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10242.5 (West 1987) (allowing charge for
late payment on loan secured by mortgage not to exceed greater of $5 or ten percent of what
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All told, credit card late charges do not fare well under the three-part test out-
lined in State Farm. The conduct at issue is not reprehensible in the slightest; these
punitive damages are excessively disproportionate to the loss occasioned by the breach.
The authorization for these charges permits late fees to be of an unconstrained size,
even though comparable wrongs are either immune from punitive damages in other
areas of contract or, when permitted, are usually much smaller and constrained in size
by statute.
B. Are Late Charges Really Punitive Damages?
It might be suggested, however, that credit card late charges are not punitive
damages at all but are in fact interest charges. Indeed, the interpretation of the NBA
affirmed in Smiley and many of the complementary relevant state statutes have in-
volved a reclassification of late charges as "interest" rather than as penalties or puni-
tive damages.'33 Therefore, it may be suggested that their legal authorization need
not conform to State Farm's declared limits.
The characterization of late charges as interest was endorsed-as a matter of
statutory interpretation of the NBA-by the Supreme Court in Smiley v. Citibank. 34
The Court's decision in Smiley, however, preceded the State Farm decision. Further,
is overdue); CAL. CIV. CODE § 2954.4 (West 1993) (permitting late payment on mortgage for
single family home no more than the greater of $5 or six percent of unpaid balance and only
after payment is more than ten days overdue); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 2231 (2001) (allowing
a charge not exceeding five percent of what is due); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-42-301 (2006)
(permitting an agreed-upon charge for payments fifteen days past due but not to exceed the
greater of $15 or five percent of what is due); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 183, § 59 (2006)
(permitting late charge not to exceed three percent of what is overdue); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 75-17-27 (West 1999) (allowing late charge only after fifteen days overdue not to exceed
the greater of $5 or four percent of delinquency); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46: 1OB-25 (West 2004)
(allowing charge not to exceed five percent of payment); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 254-b
(McKinney 2006) (allowing delinquent charge not to exceed two percent of installment);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-10.1 (2006) (permitting charge not to exceed four percent of what is
due); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.165 (West 2005) (allowing late charge not to exceed five
percent of overdue installment); see also CAL. Gov'T CODE § 53088.7 (West 1997) (per-
mitting late fees for delinquent payment of cable bill not to exceed $4.75 or 1.5% of bal-
ance); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 3010(6-B) (2006) (allowing late fees for cable not
to exceed 1.5% of monthly bill); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 22-107.2 (West 2006) (allow-
ing cable late fees on balances greater than $12, which may not exceed the greater of five
percent of balance or $6); OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 646.649 (West 2005) (permitting cable late
fees not to exceed greater of five percent or $6 and only levied on balances greater than $10);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-2-1.3 (2005) (disallowing late charges for cellular service unless payment
more than thirty days overdue); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-19-13 (2005) (disallowing late charges
on cable bill unless payment more than forty-five days overdue).
13' Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735 (1996).
"3 Id. (holding that the comptroller's interpretation of "interest" under the NBA to include
late fees was reasonable).
[Vol. 15:457
ARE CREDIT CARD LATE FEES UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
the issues presented in Smiley solely concerned questions of deference to an agency's
statutory interpretation.'35 The standard the Court applied investigated the reasonable-
ness of the agency's interpretation.'36 The opinion's emphasis was on the historical
meaning of "interest" that was likely to be implicit within the NBA's use of the term
in the nineteenth century. 137 In finding that late charges were "interest" for the purposes
of the NBA, the Court did not confront the constitutional question of the dispropor-
tionality of the punitive damages whose imposition it authorized and facilitated.3 I
Since Smiley, the Court has recognized a rather specific constitutional due process
constraint upon the imposition of punitive damages.'39 If it is a constitutional matter,
a statutory label cannot suffice to exempt what is in essence a penalty from a constitu-
tional constraint. Analogously, contracting parties cannot evade the common law rule
against penalty damages merely by declaring that agreed upon liquidated damages
are not penalties." The NBA directs which state's law should apply-that of the
bank's home state or that of the state in which the consumer lives or the transaction
occurs."' Finding that a late charge is "interest" for that choice-of-law purpose,
though, does not resolve whether it is interest or a penalty for constitutional purposes.
If late charges are in fact penalties, a statutory label cannot transform the underlying
function of the late charge as a penalty for breach into an interest charge just by decla-
ration. By analogy, neither the legislature nor the Utah Supreme Court could cure the
defects in State Farm's punitive damage award, or in similar awards generally, by
relabelling it as "interest" on the compensatory damages award.
Under traditional contracts analysis, the late charges authorized by the various
state statutes, in conjunction with the NBA, would be viewed as penalties, notwith-
standing labels and statutory classifications to the contrary.'42 Indeed, in Smiley itself,
the Supreme Court did not contest that under traditional principles of contract, these
charges would be invalid as punitive damages. The Court explicitly acknowledged
' Id. at 744.
136 Id. at 744-45.
137 Id.
13 Id. at 744-47.
'3 See supra notes 46-49.
14 California may present a complex case. The California Civil Code marks a departure
from the common law by presuming in favor of the enforceability of liquidated damages, but
it incorporates a plethora of exceptions including many concerning consumers and late
charges. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1671 (West 1985); see also Garrett v. Coast & S. Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 511 P.2d 1197, 1200-01 (Cal. 1973), superseded by statute, CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1671 (West 1985), as recognized in Weber, Lipshie & Co. v. Christian, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d
468,472 (Ct. App. 1996) (emphasizing that the determination of whether a clause is a penalty
must involve ignoring form and labels and analyzing substance).
'41 The National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2000); 12 C.F.R. § 7.4001 (2001).
142 See, e.g., Perez v. Capital One Bank, 522 S.E.2d 874, 876 (Va. 1999) (finding on behalf
of Capital One that Virginia Code § 6.1-330.63(A) abrogates Virginia common law doctrine
that would otherwise find credit card late fees to be unlawful liquidated damages).
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that these charges may well be penalties, even as they are labeled interest by the
Act. 43 "In § 85 [of the NBA], the term 'interest' is not used in contradistinction to
'penalty,' and there is no reason why it cannot include interest charges imposed for
that purpose."' 44
The substantive considerations supporting the classification of late charges as
penalties, and of late charge clauses in credit card contracts as punitive liquidated dam-
ages clauses, are located in theoretically sticky terrain. Contract law doctrine holds
that the equity of exchanges may not be assessed for adequacy or invalidated for dis-
proportionateness unless the exchange is so disproportionate (and often that the for-
mation process is so flawed) as to be unconscionable. 45 Liquidated damages clauses,
however, are treated differently and will be invalidated as penalty clauses if they do not
represent a reasonable approximation of the actual damages suffered.1" For these
two doctrines to coexist comfortably, a clear line should distinguish contractual terms
that represent the consideration, the primary objects of the exchange, and the liquidated
damages in response to breach. Unfortunately, there is no such clear line and much
depends on how the contract is written. Graduated payment schedules in the main
body of the contract may present alternative performances, and thereby, appear to be
complex articulations of contractual duties that are enforceable although they achieve
the same result as clauses worded as liquidated damages that overreach and are in-
validated as penalties.'47
Classifying a term as a penalty clause requires analysis of the form of the con-
tract, its wording, and its primary function. Although the absence of clear rules of
decision poses a difficult theoretical problem, in this context, the classification of
late charges as puntive damages is straightforward. Before the NBA preemption took
effect, credit card late fees were found to be punitive damages and those holdings rested
on solid ground. 4
8
14" Smiley, 517 U.S. at 746-47.
'" Id.; see also Nicolas v. Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank, 182 F.R.D. 226,232 (S.D. Miss. 1998)
(discussing 12 C.F.R. § 7.4001(c), which clarifies that the definition of "interest" for purposes
of the NBA's § 85 preemption of state law does not dictate the definition of "interest" for
purposes of state law).
14 See U.C.C. § 2-302 (2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFCONTRACrs §§ 79,208 (1981).
'46 See U.C.C. § 2-718; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356.
"47 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 25, § 12.18, at 316-18.
141 See, e.g., Smiley v. Citibank, 900 P.2d 690 (Cal. 1995) (distinguishing Beasley be-
cause it did not address § 85 of the NBA); Hitz v. First Interstate Bank, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 890,
900 (Ct. App. 1995) (upholding a finding that credit card late fees and overlimit fees were
penalties, not reasonable liquidated damages, although adjusting calculation of award to plain-
tiff); Beasley v. Wells Fargo Bank, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446 (Ct. App. 1991) (finding in favor of
plaintiff's challenge to Wells Fargo credit card $3 late fees as penalties and not reasonable
approximations of loss even taking into account administrative costs); see also Perez v. Capital
One Bank, 522 S.E.2d 874, 876 (Va. 1999) (finding on behalf of Capital One that Virginia Code
§ 6.1-330.63(A) abrogates Virginia common law doctrine that would otherwise find credit
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First, the semantics: "late" suggests that the payment was due at an earlier time,
and the charge is an imposed consequence for the failure to meet this contractual re-
quirement. The charge is levied in response to a partial breach. Its payment does not
represent the discharge of any primary contractual duty.
Second, the ostensible purpose of this contractual relationship is to facilitate a mode
of payment (and to loan money on a short term basis) in exchange for a timely monthly
payment for at least part of the balance, for any relevant interest payments, and in some
cases, for an annual fee. Failure to make this monthly payment on time is a breach
of this primary duty and hence the late charge is an assessment occasioned by breach.
The late charge cannot plausibly be understood as part of the primary purpose of the
contractual exchange. It is not the reason to enter into the relationship but is a conse-
quence of the failure to meet the terms of the relationship.
Third, late payments trigger other adverse consequences, suggesting that the com-
pany regards late payment not as another option for payment but rather as a failure
to meet the primary contractual requirement to pay by a particular date. Late payments
often trigger the imposition of higher "penalty" interest rates, sometimes provide the
basis for termination of the relationship, and often are reported to credit agencies. 49
Fourth, structurally similar charges and structurally similar clauses in other
contexts and contracts are recognized as penalty damages.' 50
card late fees to be punitive damages and therefore unlawful liquidated damages).
149 See U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABIITY OFFICE, supra note 8, at 5, 24; see also
Kathleen Lynn, Don't Fall into Credit Cards' Late-Payment Traps, THE RECORD (Hackensack,
N.J.), June 15, 2005, at B2. Credit reports of late credit card payments may then be the basis
of universal default interest rate hikes in which other credit card issuers raise interest rates
in reaction to a late payment made to a different credit card issuer. See Annual Credit Card
Survey 2004: Good Credit Is Your Shield Against Unfair Risk Policies, CONSUMER ACTION
NEWS (San Francisco Consumer Action, San Francisco, Cal.), May 2004, at 1, available at
http://www.consumer-action.org/archives/English/CANews/2004-May-CreditCard/?English/
CANews/2004_MayCreditCard. Automatic rate increases for behavior with other creditors
have become more rare, but many companies still change interest rates in reaction to reports
of late payments on other cards. See U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra
note 8, at 25-26.
"' See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text, and cases cited in 24 WILISTON ON
CONTRACrS § 65:1, at 222-24 nn.6-8 (4th ed. 2002); see also AT & T Capital Leasing Servs.,
Inc. v. Brasch, 912 F. Supp. 395 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (holding an invariant ten percent late penalty
on lease payment unenforceable as against Illinois public policy); Garcia v. Canan, 851 F.
Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (holding a fixed late charge of ten percent is an unenforceable
penalty); In re Hein, 60 B.R. 769 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1986) (holding that a $500-a-day late fee
on a loan was an unenforceable penalty); In re Bryant, 39 B.R. 313 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1984)
(holding that late charges disproportionate to actual damages sustained by injured party were
an unenforceable penalty); United Cable Television of Bait. Ltd. P'ship v. Burch, 732 A.2d
887,901-02 (Md. 1999), superceded by statute, 2000 MD. LAWS 59, as recognized in Plein
v. Dep't of Labor, 800 A.2d 757 (Md. 2002) (holding that a $5 late fee was an unenforceable
penalty when standardized actual damages were 10€); Stroh v. Omni Arabians, Inc., 748 A.2d
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Whether contract law has a theoretically sustainable account of the difference
among consideration, liquidated damages, and penalty clauses, it is doctrinally com-
mitted to the difference. If anything is to count as a liquidated damages clause, these
charges would fall pretty squarely in that category. These charges do not represent
the point of the exchange; they are framed as responses to a failure to perform
another duty that is the point of the contractual relationship, and prior to the pre-
emptive combination of the NBA and permissive state statutes, they were found by
courts to be penalties.15 ' Thus, if State Farm does apply to the credit card context,
it would place substantive limits on the size of the late fees that states could authorize
as responses to late payment in breach of contract because these late fees represent
forms of punitive damages.
C. Other Examples
This Article focuses on late charges levied by credit card companies because they
represent a prominent example of disproportionately large penalty damages imposed
on consumers that are in tension with the constitutional guarantees announced in the
line of cases culminating in State Farm v. Campbell. The theory of the Article may
have further implications and extensions, a few of which are discussed here.
Over-limit fees charged by credit cards and other sorts of late charges levied in
different contexts-by cable companies, phone companies, etc.-may also be vulner-
able to attack, although the case against them is more complex. Over-limit fees are
imposed when a customer spends an amount that exceeds his or her credit limit. These
are also exorbitant fees that are not calibrated to the amount by which the limit is ex-
ceeded or to any losses suffered by the credit card issuer. 52 Unlike late payments,
however, credit card companies have some control over whether consumers charge
above their limit. When the credit charge is processed electronically (as opposed to
a manual imprint being made and later sent to the credit card company), the credit card
issuers are in the position to permit or to deny authorization for a charge that exceeds
the consumer's credit limit. Issuers keep track of charges and can refuse to authorize
charges that exceed the credit limit or come close to the ceiling. Their authorization
of overcharges that trigger over-limit fees without notifying the consumer at the point
1015, 1019-20 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (holding that any late charges above six percent
of debt were unenforceable penalties because Maryland fixed statutory late payment fees at
six percent per annum).
1s See supra cases discussed in note 148. Although Mattvidi Associates Ltd. Partnership
v. NationsBank of Virginia, 639 A.2d 228,238 (Md. App. 1994), argued late charges are valid
under Virginia law because administrative costs from late payment are too difficult to approxi-
mate, this view seems to have been rejected in Perez, which held Virginia common law doctrine
would find credit card late fees to be unlawful penalty damages but that the common law was
abrogated by statute. See Perez v. Capital One Bank, 522 S.E.2d 874, 876 (Va. 1999).
152 See U.S. GOVERNMENT AccouNTABurrY OFFICE, supra note 8, at 20-21 (reporting
most over-limit fees were between $35 and $39 in 2005).
[Vol. 15:457
ARE CREDIT CARD LATE FEES UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
of the charge may show credit card companies to be particularly shameless from a
moral perspective. Legally, the companies might contend that the over-limit fee is
a form of consideration required for more credit, rather than a penalty for breach of
payment. The company will authorize the extra charge in exchange for a fee.' This
characterization has some difficulties, though. This structure is not made explicit to
the consumer at the time the overcharge occurs, and the consumer is often entirely
unaware that she has charged over her limit. 54
Late charges are also levied in other consumer contexts-on utility bills, cable
bills, cell phone bills, etc. They might also be subject to challenge but tend to be lower
in many jurisdictions, 55 in part because they do not fall under the protection of the
NBA and its exportation doctrine. Hence, they are still subject to a state's common
law doctrine invalidating punitive damages, or subject to other forms of state regu-
lation protecting consumers.
IV. Do LATE FEES INVOLVE STATE ACTION? STATE ACTION AND THE
STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO LATE FEES
Credit card companies are not directly subject to constitutional limitations.'56 To
challenge disproportionate late charges as unconstitutional, there must be state action. 7
Typically, private parties contract for late charges and the consumer voluntarily pays
the charges without any sort of formal enforcement action or direct state involve-
ment. This private action between private parties is not directly subject to constitu-
tional scrutiny. 5
While the private agreement itself is not state action, the law or the state action
that authorizes, facilitates, or enforces the collection of punitive damages is subject to
constitutional scrutiny. For instance, if in litigation, a party invokes a statute to enforce
the collection of punitive damages or to defend its charges or its collection activity, then
'sa Overdraft or insufficient funds charges in the checking context have been found by some
courts not to be liquidated damages. See, e.g., Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 702 P.2d 503,
516 (Cal. 1995) (holding that insufficient funds charges are not liquidated damages or penalties
because writing a bad check was not a breach of contract given the absence of a specific agree-
ment not to write an overdraft); Jacobs v. Citibank, 462 N.E.2d 1182 (N.Y. 1984) (holding
the same and emphasizing that the U.C.C. explicitly contemplates overdrafts).
114 In the 1990s, two California cases invalidated over-limit fees on the grounds that they
were penalties. See Hitz v. First Interstate Bank, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 890, 899 (Ct. App. 1995)
(finding late fees and over-limit fees to be penalties and that consumers often accidentally
exceeded their limit); Beasley v. Wells Fargo Bank, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446 (Ct. App. 1991)
(finding late fees and over-limit fees to be penalties).
115 See supra note 52.
'56 Cf Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment
does not prohibit wrongful or discriminating conduct by private parties).
157 Id.
158 See id.
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that statute is subject to constitutional challenge. If it is invalidated, then the relief or
defense may be unavailable. Subpart A below explores the general approach to state
action that would undergird a constitutional challenge to the legal authorization and
enforcement of disproportionately large credit card fees. In the subparts that follow,
different strategies for litigation are identified that highlight the relevant form of
state action.
A. The General Doctrinal Argument That State Action Is Implicated in
Enforceable Late Fees
The theory of this Article is that those federal and state statutes that override or
abrogate the common law rule against the enforcement of punitive damages in con-
tract, may be challenged as unconstitutional, at least as applied. They directly authorize
the imposition of enforceable punitive damages for late payment of credit card bills
without imposing any guidelines on the size of these damages. Thus, they make no
effort to ensure that the penalty damages they authorize stay within constitutional
guidelines. Furthermore, the NBA enacts a choice-of-law rule that permits companies
to charge what is allowed under the state law of their headquarters. 5 9 It, thereby,
authorizes a method of setting enforceable penalty damages that is insensitive to con-
stitutional mandates.
Late fees collected pursuant to statutes insensitive to State Farm strictures might
be challenged indirectly by subjecting the underlying legal authority that authorized
the charges to constitutional scrutiny. Further, when significant forms of state action
are implicated, such as when wage garnishment and liens are sought as modes of
enforcement, a § 1983 counter-claim might be asserted against credit card companies
(or collection agencies) on the grounds that their efforts to enlist and collaborate with
state officials to impose unconstitutional punitive damages place their actions "under
color of state law.' ' "W If successful, a § 1983 action makes attorneys' fees available.' 6 '
This approach to state action is supported by cases such as New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan 62 New York Times involved a private cause of action: a suit by one private
party against another for the tort of libel. 63 The invocation in litigation, however, of
the state law of libel and the prospect of its enforcement was sufficient state action
159 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2000).
'" Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 942 (1982) (permitting § 1983 action
against a private creditor for due process violation involved when creditor, acting jointly with
state officials, wrongfully attached property).
161 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988(b) (2000).
162 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see also Shelley, 334 U.S. 1 (finding state action in judicial
enforcement of racially restrictive covenants). The general approach to state action defend-
ed here follows Stephen Gardbaum, The "Horizontal Effect" of Constitutional Rights, 102
MICH. L. REV. 387 passim (2003).
163 N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 256.
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to permit the underlying law to be challenged for its inconsistency with the First
Amendment.'" A like theory was affirmed more recently in Cohen v. Cowles Media
Co.'65 In that case, the Court considered a First Amendment challenge to a promissory
estoppel action in which a source sued a reporter for breach of a confidentiality agree-
ment.t" The reporter argued in reply that enforcement of a promissory estoppel action
in these circumstances would violate the First Amendment.'67 While the reporter lost
the substantive issue concerning the First Amendment, the Court did not hesitate in
finding state action. 6 "Our cases teach that the application of state rules of law in state
courts in a manner alleged to restrict First Amendment freedoms constitutes 'state
action' under the Fourteenth Amendment."' 69 Notably, even though the law of prom-
issory estoppel in general was not alleged to be unconstitutional, its potential appli-
cation to the particular enforcement action being litigated was sufficient for the Court
to find state action. 7°
Two factors might distinguish these cases from constitutional challenges of the
enforcement of credit card late fees. First, both New York Times and Cowles pertain
to First Amendment challenges, not due process challenges. '7 While the language
in Cowles emphasizes the First Amendment nature of the claim,172 it is unclear what
the argument would be as to why this difference should be dispositive. No argument
is given in either case to suggest that the recognition of state action in those cases
depends on the constitutional clause at issue being the First Amendment.
Cowles might be read, however, to suggest that it does matter that the cause of
action is one created by the state. In that case, the reporter was subject to a duty he
had not agreed to undertake but was imposed on him through the rules of promissory
estoppel. 173 It might be suggested that in the case of credit card late fees, the obli-
gations have been explicitly assumed by the parties and are not especially imposed
by the state. 174 However, the case of contractual late penalties does not in fact pose
a sharp contrast with the structure of the situation addressed in Cowles. While it is
'" Id. at 265 (holding that court application of statute or common law in civil suit renders
statute or common law open to constitutional scrutiny).
165 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
166 Id.
167 Id. at 668.
168 Id.
169 Id. (citing Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986); NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 n.51 (1982); N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 265).
170 Id.
'71 N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 264 n.4; Cowles, 501 U.S. at 667.
172 Cowles, 501 U.S. at 667 ("We granted certiorari to consider the First Amendment impli-
cations of this case.").
'73 Id. at 670-71.
17' To hold that this difference is dispositive is not, however, consistent with the under-
lying theory of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). This will not trouble those who regard
Shelley as having been limited to its context over time.
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true that in the credit card context, the contracting parties assume the obligations to
pay late fees for late payment, the ability to contract in this way is, as argued above,
unusual from a common law perspective. The enforcement of high penalties for late
payment does not represent the standard application of private law norms. The stan-
dard private law approach would invalidate these charges as arising from illegitimate
penalty clauses. For these obligations to exist, affirmative state action-in the form
of state statutes, the NBA, and DIDA-had to be taken to override the background
baseline and to provide explicit permission for charges of this kind. These forms of
state action were taken to further the national banking system and to further partic-
ular state's interests.175 In this respect, the legal context surrounding credit card late
fees closely resembles, while exceeding in degree, the positive state action recognized
in Cowles.
To show that state action underlies legally enforceable credit card late fees, Flagg
Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks should be distinguished. 76 Flagg Brothers found no state
action in a sale by a private warehouse of another's goods entrusted to the warehouse
for storage, although such sales were explicitly authorized by the New York Uniform
Commercial Code (N.Y.U.C.C.).177 The state authorization of a private party's sale
(according to methods that might not satisfy due process were they the actions of the
state) did not make the private sale itself state action. 78 So, too, it might be asked:
how does the state authorization of a private party's charging high late fees, subject
to another party's consent, make those charges state action?
In Flagg Brothers, the issue was whether the private party's sale pursuant to the
authorizing statute was state action. 179 The relevant portion of the statute, Section
7-210 of the N.Y.U.C.C., was not directly challenged. All the Supreme Court found
was that the private party's sale itself was not state action, although it was pursuant
to an authorizing statute.180 No skepticism was evinced that the underlying statute
itself represented state action.'8
There is a further distinction between Flagg Brothers and a challenge mounted
against the legal structure authorizing disproportionately high late fees. Flagg Brothers
involved a sale pursuant to a lien.182 Arguably, the lien already effected a transfer of
property (conditional on the failure to meet the conditions to clear title). An agreement
PS See supra text accompanying notes 75-80; see also Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369
(1967) (finding California referendum repealing law against private discrimination did not
merely permit private discrimination but, in context, encouraged it, and therefore, was state
action).
176 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
177 Id. at 164-65.
178 Id.
179 id. at 155.
80 Id. at 165.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 151.
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to pay a late charge does not already effect a transfer of property but rather requires
further action-either voluntary compliance or state enforcement.
As was noted at the outset, credit card late fees themselves are not directly subject
to constitutional challenge. Two forms of state action enable credit card late fees to
be subject to constitutional assessment: (1) the state and federal statutes themselves
that authorize enforceable penalties of any size, without clear guidelines; and (2) the
actual enforcement of these penalties pursuant to state authorization. There is no
question that statutes are themselves forms of state action. Should these forms of
state action, which authorize and enforce disproportionately large late fees, be found
unconstitutional, the charges would no longer be enforceable given the underlying
traditional principles of contract law. While the main aim of this Article is to explore
the constitutional status of the legal structure that gives support to and enforces credit
card late fees, a brief discussion of three different ways litigation against credit card
late fees could be framed will help to illuminate the presence of state action.
B. Recoupment Actions
One way to frame a constitutional challenge against credit card late fees is to begin
with a straightforward common law or statutory action to recoup a charge that is not
legally authorized. The defenses that could be offered by the credit card company that
levied the fee would appeal to those previously mentioned statutes and regulations
that authorize collection of the fees. That is, federal and state statutes would emerge
as defenses to the common law or statutory recoupment claim. If the arguments of
Parts II and 111 above are correct, those authorizing statutes are themselves unconstitu-
tional legislative action. So, the plaintiff's counter to this statutory defense would be
that the statutes themselves are unconstitutional under State Farm. The underlying
common law action to invalidate penalty damages would thereby be revived.' 83
Whether the cause of action for recoupment would be a common law or statutory
cause of action is slightly complex in the case of credit cards covered by the NBA.
Charges imposed by a card owned by a non-federally-insured, state-chartered bank
are subject to whatever common law recoupment action and usury claims are appli-
cable under state law. Federally-insured, state-chartered banks may also be liable under
standard state causes of action under the laws of their home states.'84 The situation
is less clear with respect to cards issued by nationally-chartered banks, the majority
of credit cards. 85 Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson suggests that 12 U.S.C. § § 85
183 See Gardbaum, supra note 162, at 421.
' Further, although DIDA pre-empts state regulation of interest rates charged by federally-
insured, state chartered banks, including usury laws, it does not provide such banks with pro-
tection from other common law claims. 12 U.S.C. § 183 1(d) (2000).
5 Furletti, supra note 29, at 425 (reporting nationally chartered banks underwrite the
majority of credit card loans in the United States).
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and 86 offer the exclusive avenues of relief for allegations of overcharging for cards
covered by the NBA.186 If so, this would render the cause of action subject to federal
question jurisdiction.
Although Anderson uses expansive language in its declaration that the NBA
creates "a federal remedy for overcharges that is exclusive,"'' 87 Anderson concerned
usury and the federal pre-emption of state usury laws only. 88 The majority opinion
uses "remedy for overcharges" and "remedy for usury" interchangeably. 189 One may
question whether "usury" is meant to cover all cases in which excessive interest is
charged, or whether it covers only those sorts of cases typically regulated by usury
law and consumer protection statutes in which ceilings on permissible charges are
articulated. For instance, accidental overcharges of interest may fall under the broader
former designation but not the latter; that is, they may be overcharges but they are
not traditional forms of usury because there is no usurious intent. It may be argued
that the NBA pre-empts traditional state usury laws but not all state causes of action
that remedy bread and butter forms of overcharging. Some support for this interpre-
tation may be gleaned from a recent regulation of the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency.' 9° It declares that NBA pre-emption over the law of the consumer's
home state does not extend so far as to pre-empt those state laws that only "inciden-
tally affect" lending practices, such as those regulating contracts, torts, recollection
of debts, and the criminal law.' 9' This may suggest that general efforts to remedy
accidental and un-"knowing" overcharges, or charges that are otherwise simply not
authorized by law, are not pre-empted by these sections and can be pursued through
standard state law means. Their pursuit would then trigger the assertion of § 85 expor-
tation doctrine as a defense, against which the plaintiffs would argue that an uncon-
stitutional statute cannot be invoked to defend a charging practice.
The structure of § § 85 and 86 provides some evidence that the NBA pre-empts only
traditional usury regulations. While the language of § 85 is broad in stating limits as
to what interest a national bank may charge, the language of § 86, the attached remedy
provision, is circumscribed. It only explicitly provides for a (rather generous) remedy
for knowing overcharges. 92 It is unclear whether the "knowing" requirement is
186 539 U.S. 1 (2003) (holding a challenge to H & R Block's interest charges based on
common law usury claims and an Alabama statute limiting the amount of permissible interest
was pre-empted by the NBA, and therefore, federal question jurisdiction was appropriate).
187 Id. at 11.
188 Id. at 9.
189 See id. at 10 (using both "action for usury" and "remedies for... overcharges").
'90 See 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008(e)(1), (4)-(5) (providing that state law governing contracts, prop-
erty, and collection of debts are not pre-empted by the NBA so long as it is not inconsistent with
and only incidentally affects the exercise of national banks' non-real estate lending powers).
lal See Furletti, supra note 29, at 439.
192 12 U.S.C. § 86 (remedying overcharges that are "knowingly done"). It provides for larger
remedies than standard recoupment actions, although it carries a two-year statute of limitations.
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satisfied just by intentionally levying a charge, by stating clearly the illegal charge
as a charge on a bill (as opposed to an overcharge resulting from individual graft or
corruption) 93 or whether the bank must be aware the charge is illegal. 94 The NBA
provides no explicit remedy for overcharges that are not "knowing," i.e., that do not
fall under § 86. Perhaps § 85 implies a standard recoupment remedy as a matter of
federal common law. Some language in Panos v. Smith 95 provides support for this
view. Discussing § 85, the Sixth Circuit said, "When a national bank takes more
interest than is permitted by the law of the state in which it is located, it violates the
law of the United States. It is that law that creates the borrower's right and provides
his remedy."'" Were § 85 not to imply a remedy for overcharges that are not knowing,
it may be argued that state common law is not pre-empted and that a standard state
recoupment action could be pursued.
In sum, recoupment actions for overcharges based on state law may be available
for cards issued by state and nationally chartered banks. If they are not available for
nationally chartered banks on the grounds that the NBA pre-empts all other causes
of action relating to credit card transactions, then there are two alternatives. The
NBA may be read to imply a federal common law cause of action for recoupment.
In addition, the requirements for a § 86 overcharge may be met, making double dam-
ages available. On any of these theories, a non-constitutional recoupment cause of
If a higher rate of interest is charged than is allowed by § 85, then under § 86 all of the interest
due on the debt is forfeited. If the excessive interest has been paid already, then twice the
interest paid is recoverable as punitive damages.
193 Some support for this second interpretation-that an overcharge is "knowing" if the
charge is made as a matter of policy-can be gleaned from American Timber & Trading Co.
v. First Nat'l Bank of Oregon, 511 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 921 (1975).
That court held that the knowledge requirement was met in a case in which a bank did not
know its charge was illegal, although it knew its method would yield a higher rate than alter-
natives. Id. at 983. If this view of knowledge is sustainable, than a § 86 action may be available
that would provide a remedy of twice the excess late fees already paid.
'9 See, e.g., Walters v. First Tenn. Bank, 855 F.2d 267, 272 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
489 U.S. 1067 (1989) (dismissing a § 86 claim and finding that "an honest mistake of fact, e.g.,
a mistake in computation, is not usurious"). Only some jurisdictions distinguish between mis-
takes of fact and law, regarding the former but not the latter as a defense to a claim of usury
or usurious intent. See 11 A.L.R. 3d 1498 § 4 (collecting cases and statutes from eight states
that make the distinction). In some jurisdictions, an honest mistake of law is not a defense to
a charge of usury for service charges in particular, including late fees. See id. § 8(b). But see
RIcHARD A. LORD, 9 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, § 20:35, at 116 (4th ed. 1999) (reporting that
in some jurisdictions "a willful purpose to transgress the law is essential" to a claim of
usury). Because the explanation of why late fees are legally excessive involves the application
of a novel theory, one might argue the requisite intent is not present so that usury is not at issue;
with respect to this issue, banks may have levied the fees in legal good faith. If usury is not at
issue, then the NBA may not pre-empt other state causes of action to recoup the excessive fees.
9 116 F.2d 445 (6th Cir. 1940).
'96 Id. at 446.
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action would be filed to reverse an overcharge. The credit card companies would
defend by citing the relevant permission of the state statute or, for an out of state bank,
by citing the permission of DIDA or § 85 to export home state rules on late fees. That
defense would then invoke either one or two forms of state action, both of which this
Article has argued are subject to constitutional challenge. The essence of the theory
of this strategy is that an overcharge cannot be defended by appeal to an unconsti-
tutional statute.
There are two other options for framing litigation against credit card late fees
based on State Farm, both of which satisfy state action requirements.
C. Injunction or Declaratory Judgment
An injunction or a declaratory judgment might be sought to declare the relevant
regulations and statutes unconstitutional and to reinstate statutory and common law
limits on penalty damages and late charges in consumer contracts. Or, in the alter-
native, one might seek a declaratory judgment to interpret the NBA and other relevant
statutes to render them constitutional. Applying canons of constitutional avoidance,
they may be interpreted as implicitly incorporating substantive limitations on penalty
damages that would bring it in line with State Farm. Under this interpretation, the
late charges currently assessed would outstrip the authority granted by the NBA. Such
measures might support restitutionary measures and might activate the provisions
of § 86 of the NBA against further late charges. As discussed in Subpart B above,
that provision provides for the forfeiture of the "entire interest" of the debt when the
issuer knowingly charges interest in excess of that permitted by 12 U.S.C. § 85 plus
that amount again in punitive damages.'97
Any offensive litigation based on the theory of this Article would have to resolve
a number of other strategic issues and obstacles. These include whether a federal
court would be available and desirable whether the choice of forum, choice of law,
and arbitration clauses within many credit card agreements are binding and what
effect they would have and whether particular states (and particular state statutes) are
particularly friendly places to initiate suits of this kind, states such as Massachusetts,
Minnesota, and California that still have consumer protective statutes that are pre-
empted by the NBA.'98
The choice of state versus federal court may be determined partly by the criteria
of composition of the litigant class. If the class encompasses charges made by na-
tional banks and if §§ 85 and 86 of the NBA apply to this case, then federal question
jurisdiction may be established by the underlying cause of action;' this would fa-
cilitate suit in federal court or removal by defendants to federal court. The Class
Action Fairness Act would also facilitate removal by defendants to federal court
unless the class composition was carefully controlled so that residents of a particular
197 See 12 U.S.C. § 86; supra text accompanying notes 192-96.
198 See supra note 61.
'99 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2005).
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state predominated and at least one of the defendant banks was located in the
state.
200
The arbitration clauses common in credit card agreements pose an obstacle to
litigating in court,20 ' although these clauses may be subject to challenge. 2 2 Uncon-
scionability challenges against the substance of the clause have met with some success.
For instance, in Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, 3 California
recognized circumstances in which mandatory arbitration clauses are unconscionable.
The California Supreme Court also recently recognized circumstances in the consumer
credit context in which mandatory waivers of access to class action were unconsciona-
ble, whether the waiver applied to class action litigation or to class-wide arbitration.2 °4
The California court found "an element of procedural unconscionability" in the waiver
because it appeared in an adhesive contract and, in particular, because the waiver at
issue was added to the agreement through a bill insert.20 5 It also found the waiver
itself to be substantively unconscionable because given the small amount of money
200 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (d)(4) (2005) (declining federal court diversityjurisdiction when
more than two-thirds of the plaintiff class and at least one defendant are citizens of the state
where the action was originally filed provided certain other conditions are met, or when two-
thirds or more of the plaintiff class and all primary defendants are citizens of the same state).
201 See generally Johanna Harrington, Comment, To Litigate or Arbitrate? No Matter-
The Credit Card Industry Is Deciding for You, 2001 J. DisP. RESOL. 101 (noting that many
credit card agreements now contain mandatory arbitration clauses that prevent people from
seeking redress from a court).
202 "Generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability,
may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements. .. ." Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto,
517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
203 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000) (finding mandatory arbitration clause in employment contract
contrary to public policy and unconscionable). But see Bischoff v. DirecTV, Inc., 180 F. Supp.
2d 1097, 1111 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (distinguishingAnnendariz because the customer agreement
in question was not so one-sided as to render it unconscionable and economic pressure on
customer was not high).
204 Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).
205 Id. at 1108. Some other courts have also found the introduction of arbitration agreements
through bill inserts an improper form of contract modification. See, e.g., Stone v. Golden Wexler
& Samese, 341 F. Supp. 2d 189 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (analyzing Virginia contract law); Perry
v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. Civ. A. 04-507,2004 WL 1508518, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 6,2004)
(analyzing Rhode Island contract law); Myers v. MBNA Am., No. CVOO-163-M-DWM,
2001 WL 965063 (D. Mont. Mar. 20,2001); Badie v. Bank of Am., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273 (Ct.
App. 1998) (analyzing California law); Discover Bank v. Shea, 827 A.2d 358, 360, 365 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 2001) (disallowing unilaterally added arbitration clause and finding a
clause precluding class-wide arbitration unconscionable); Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Avery, 593
S.E.2d 424 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (analyzing Arizona law on contracts of adhesion). But see
Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 393 (Ct. App. 2003) (finding unilateral
addition permissible under Delaware law), supersededby Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113
P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005); Hutcherson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 793 N.E.2d 886 (Ill. App. Ct.
2003) (finding unilateral addition of arbitration clause permissible under Arizona law).
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at stake for each individual consumer, the ban on class actions worked to permit the
credit card company to evade responsibility for illegal activity-in this case, charging
a late fee for a payment received after 1 p.m. but still on the due date.2 6 The California
court emphasized, however, that allegations were made that Discover Card was delib-
erately cheating individual consumers.2 °7 That particular allegation may not be apt
in a more general challenge against high credit card fees. Nonetheless, for the more
general case that this Article suggests could be made against most credit card late fees,
an unconscionability challenge against arbitration agreements that threaten to pre-
clude judicial assessment of late fees might be further enhanced by the fact that the
protection and adjudication of constitutional rights and values is at issue. Further, at
the time of assent, this was not apparent.2 °s
Even if the arbitration clauses themselves are not vulnerable to challenge, class-
wide arbitration may be available in some jurisdictions. Although credit card com-
panies have attempted to evade class-wide arbitration through the use of waivers, these
efforts have not been uniformly successful. 29 The California Supreme Court found
a clause banning class-wide arbitration in a Discover Card agreement unconscio-
nable under California law.210 Courts in Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Missouri, New
206 Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1103, 1110; see also Leonard v. Terminex Int'l. Co, 854
So. 2d 529, 538 (Ala. 2002); Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570, 576 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1999); State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265,279 (W. Va. 2002), cert. denied,
537 U.S. 1087 (2002). But see Blaz v. Belfer, 368 F.3d 501,504 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied,
543 U.S. 874 (2004); Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366,369 (3d Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 1145 (2001); Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 277 (7th Cir. 1995);
Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n N.D., 693 N.W.2d 918, 926 (N.D. 2005).
207 Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1103.
208 Cf. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79,90-92 (2000) (making a simi-
lar claim concerning the ability to vindicate statutory rights effectively in the face of high arbi-
tration costs).
209 See Robert S. Safi, Note, Beyond Unconscionability: Preserving the Class Mechanism
Under State Law in the Era of Consumer Arbitration, 83 TEx. L. REV. 1715, 1715, 1726-28
& passim (2005) (discussing class-wide arbitration, efforts to evade it through contract, and
challenges that have been and may be made to such efforts).
210 Discover Bank, 113 P.3d 1100 (finding class action waiver and class-wide arbitration
waiver unconscionable and the California rule against class action waivers was not federally
preempted); see also Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1175 (9th Cir. 2003),
cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1160 (2004); Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862 (Ct. App.
2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1226 (2003); Discover Bank v. Shea, 827 A.2d 358 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 2001); Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 809 N.E.2d 1161 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).
But see, e.g., Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 393 (Ct. App. 2003) (find-
ing addition of class-wide arbitration waiver permissible under Delaware law and resolving
choice of law issue for Delaware because no specific violation of California law was part of
the pleading); Edelist v. MBNA Am. Bank, 790 A.2d. 1249 (Del. Super. Ct. 2001); Rosen v.
SCIL, LLC, 799 N.E.2d 488 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003); Ranieri v. Bell Atl. Mobile, 759 N.Y.S.2d
448 (App. Div. 2003).
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Jersey, and other states have arrived at similar conclusions.2"' However, even if the
clauses are unconscionable, it is still unsettled whether the choice of law provisions
in the contracts apply to these clauses or whether the choice of law provisions only
apply to "substantive claims." If the former, the California finding of unconscio-
nability may be rendered moot if the waivers are instead governed by the law of
Delaware or South Dakota, states especially friendly to bank interests. However, at
least in California, prior cases have indicated a reluctance to allow choice of law
provisions to nullify state policy favoring access to class actions.212
D. Defenses Against Collection Actions
A final alternative approach would invoke a significantly more conservative,
defensive theory of state action. It would assert the theory of this Article as a defense
to a collection action by the credit card companies (or the collection agency to whom
the credit card company assigns the debt).21 3 In this scenario, the state action would
211 Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570, 576 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Kinkel v.
Cingular Wireless, LLC, 828 N.E.2d 812, 818 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (holding class-wide arbi-
tration ban in contract unenforceable because unconscionable); Whitney v. Alltel Commc'ns,
Inc., 173 S.W.3d 300 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (finding anti-class action provision in a wireless
contract unconscionable); Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, 912 A.2d 88,
100-01 (N.J. 2006) (finding class-wide arbitration waiver clause unconscionable); Lytle v.
CitiFinancial Servs., Inc., 810 A.2d 643 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (holding mortgage anti-class
provision unconscionable); Thibodeau v. Comcast, No. 4526, 2006 WL 416863 (Pa. Com.
P1. Jan. 27, 2006); State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265,278-79 (W. Va. 2002), cert.
denied, 537 U.S. 1087 (2002); see also Luna v. Household Fin. Corp. III, 236 F. Supp. 2d
1166 (W.D. Wash. 2002) (finding arbitration rider unconscionable under Washington law);
Lozada v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (W.D. Mich. 2000) (finding under
Michigan law, class action waiver was unconscionable); Leonard v. Terminix Int'l Co., 854
So. 2d 529,535 (Ala. 2002). See generally Issacharoff & Delaney, supra note 20; Safi, supra
note 209.
For classes whose membership is restricted to residents of a single state, state law may also
provide relief against clauses that forbid class action suits. For example, in California, the
right to bring a class action under the Consumers Legal Remedies Act is not waivable. CAL.
CIV. CODE §§ 1750-1752 (West 1998). It may be argued that this right is not preempted by
the NBA in light of 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008, which exempts from pre-emption those state laws
that have only an incidental effect on the loaning practices of national banks.
212 See, e.g., Nediloyd Lines B.V. v. Superior Court, 834 P.2d 1148, 1155 (Cal. 1992); Am.
Online, Inc. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding that choice of
law agreements will not be given effect when strong state policy or access to a forum for
protection would be circumvented).
23 Collection agencies now handle a very large amount of credit card debt, which includes
incorporated late fees. In 2003, credit card companies sold $57.3 billion of written-off credit
card debt to collection agencies. Peter Benesh, These Debt Collectors Try the Gentle Touch,
INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Apr. 28,2004, at A8. The agencies often use wage garnishment and
liens as methods of collection. See id; Suein Hwang, AssetAcceptance, A New Type of Collector,
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be more evident because a court would be engaged in an enforcement action.2 14 If
the court were to enforce the credit card company's full claim, including the late
charge, it would thereby impose punitive damages that exceed State Farm guide-
lines. A similar approach might be taken in bankruptcy proceedings to challenge the
recognition of these late fees as part of the debtor's debt.215
CONCLUSION: IS IT GOOD FOR THE GANDER?
This Article has argued that the federal and many state statutes that authorize
credit card late charges are subject to constitutional challenge because they authorize
enforceable penalties that are severely disproportionate to the costs imposed by late
payment. The Article's general strategy is to argue that the very same constitutional
doctrine that is thought to serve the interests of non-consumer defendants, by plac-
ing a cap on the punitive damages for which they may be liable, may also serve the
interests of consumers.
This claim raises the question of whether a successful challenge on constitutional
grounds of the legal authorization for credit card late fees would actually serve con-
sumer interests in any significant way. If credit card companies were not pennitted
to charge late fees or were required to constrain the size of those late fees so they did
not run afoul of constitutional constraints, they might respond by raising interest rates
and charging annual fees on all accounts to make up for this lost revenue.216 Con-
sumers as a whole might not save any money, but rather the points of charge would
just shift. Further, it might be objected that the costs of this relocation would fall on
consumers as a general class rather than being visited on late payers who now pay
a special premium for their own controllable behavior.2 7 Finally, were interest rates
Hits Paydirt Suing for Modest Sums, WAIL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2004, at Al.
214 "[W]hen private parties make use of state procedures with the overt, significant assistance
of state officials, state action may be found." Tulsa Prof 1 Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485
U.S. 478,486 (1988) (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982), and Sniadach
v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), and distinguishing Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436
U.S. 149 (1978)).
215 See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) (2006) (providing that bankruptcy court should disallow
bank's claim to the extent it is not allowable under non-bankruptcy law).
216 They might do this at the outset, or they might raise interest rates and charge annual fees
as a response to late payment. See Caroline E. Mayer, No Late Fees, But Watch Out for Late
Rates: New Credit Card Offers Remove Common Penalty, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2005, at D I
(reporting on new card accounts from Citibank, Commerce Bank, and American Express).
Whether the latter maneuver would raise the same constitutional problems as discussed in
this Article might depend on whether the higher interest rates were applied to future trans-
actions (in which they might be considered new terms for future contracts), or whether the rates
also applied to existing transactions. If it were the latter, there might be an argument that the
higher interest rates served as penalties, although there would also be a good argument that
they were permissible modifications on the terms of an ongoing loan, rather than penalties.
217 See Furletti, supra note 29, at 444-45 (suggesting that late fees permit card issuers to
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to rise and annual fees to increase, consumers of modest means might have a more
difficult time gaining and maintaining access to credit lines.2"'
It is difficult to predict whether the invalidation of current late fee charge practices
would just shift those charges onto consumers in another guise, whether the loss would
be absorbed by the credit card companies, or whether some combination of these two
effects would result.21 9 (The articulation of these alternatives assumes, of course, that
no complementary legislative action is taken to regulate other charges and rates.) If
the argument of the Article is correct, late fees do not serve as necessary compensation
for the costs of late payments; the costs of late payments are captured through the
charging of interest on outstanding principal, among other techniques. They may,
however, represent efforts to recoup other business operating expenses while keeping
interest rates and annual fees lower. There is some evidence, however, that the 1995
comptroller's regulation, which made way for the exportation of home state policies
on late fees, served mainly to increase the income of credit card companies rather than
inducing them to shift from blunt forms of seeking revenue to more particularized
forms. While many issuers no longer charge annual fees, 22° interest rates on credit card
charges have not been as responsive to the decline in costs of money.22' This is not
dispositive evidence, of course, but it gives some reason to think that late fee charges
may partly represent windfall payments and not necessary expenses whose cost must
222 thebe spread in another way. If so, the expense of precluding disproportionate late
allocate collection costs to late payers specifically and that the alternative is higher interest rates
for everyone). Furletti, however, does not discuss the "penalty" interest rates that are triggered
by late payments. This practice also permits issuers to allocate additional collection costs with
specificity and in ways targeted to the amount owed. It is thus unclear that disproportionate
and uncalibrated late fees are essential to this effort.
218 As a consequence, they might face obstacles to economic activity or they might resort
to more disadvantageous methods of borrowing, such as payday loans or loan sharks.
29 See Bar-Gill, supra note 53, at 1376 nn.12-13, 1377 (discussing dispute in literature
whether credit card companies enjoy "supra-competitive" profit levels); see also BD. OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE PROFITABILrTY OF CREDIT CARD OPERATIONS
OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS 2-4 (2005), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/board
docs/rptcongress/creditcard/2005/ccprofit.pdf (reporting that the credit card industry is highly
competitive but that "credit card earnings have been consistently higher than returns on all
commercial bank activities").
220 Bar-Gill, supra note 53, at 1391 & n.92.
221 See id. at 1389; see also WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 12, at 145-46 & passim (arguing
the credit card market is not well-functioning and sufficiently competitive). But see EVANS
& SCHMALENSEE, supra note 29, at 240 (questioning some earlier findings that credit card
rates were significantly unresponsive to changes in the cost of money).
222 See TIM WESTRICH & MALCOLM BUSH, BLINDFOLDED INTO DEBT: A COMPARISON OF
CREDIT CARD COSTS AND CONDITIONS AT BANKS AND CREDIT UNIONS 17 (2005), available
at http://www.woodstockinst.org/publications/research-reports (comparing credit card rates
from banks and credit unions and arguing that "the credit union data.., demonstrate that
credit card lending can be done without exorbitant fees and without confusing terms").
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fee charges might be borne by the credit card companies, and would thereby, serve
to the advantage of consumers.
But suppose annual fees and interest rates were to rise significantly as a conse-
quence of constraining the size of late fees. This might have some modest benefits
for consumers if those categories are more salient to consumers than late fees.223 In
that case, consumers' decisions may be more informed. The greater salience may
induce more comparison shopping and greater competitive behavior by credit providers
than is induced by late fee charges whose likelihood is often discounted by consumers
when shopping for cards.224 The effect would be disadvantageous to consumers if these
categories were less salient than late fees and especially if the costs of a higher annual
interest rate triggered by constraints on late fees overshadowed the costs of the late
fees themselves. The evidence on the subject is mixed. As Oren Bar-Gill has argued,
short-term costs such as annual fees are often highly salient to consumers because con-
sumers know they will have to pay them. He argues, however, that consumers tend
to discount the significance of interest rates and late fees due to exaggerated optimism
about their discipline in spending and ability to pay.22 A large increase in interest
rates could be hazardous for consumers. Although, decreasing the number of different
factors that may induce high charges could help to focus consumers' attention on in-
terest rates by introducing greater simplicity and fewer factors to consider. This might
introduce both greater prudence by consumers and more competition because of a
better informed consumer base.
Limits on late charges might generate more active efforts by credit card providers
to limit access to individuals who pose higher credit risks. This, too, is a mixed
blessing. While it is important that people of modest means and those with prior
difficulties with credit have access to credit, it is not clearly in their interest to gain
access to credit lines but be unable to make the payments on them and be subject to
penalties for late payment that compound the difficulties they face.226
Nonetheless, the question of whether consumers as a whole or those consumers
most disadvantaged by high late fees from the invalidation of the current late fee
practice is not relevant to the constitutional question of whether these penalties are
disproportionately high. If the argument of this Article is correct, these authorizing
statutes authorize enforceable penalties in violation of the substantive due process
constraints of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, no matter whose interests they
serve or frustrate. Sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander, whether it tastes good
with either.
223 See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 29, at 218 (citing survey that annual fees and
interest rates on purchases were the main criteria for credit card selection).
224 See Bar-Gill, supra note 53, at 1407-08 & n.145.
225 Id. at 1395-1408; see also EvANs & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 29, at 95.
226 See WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 12, at 138-39, 150-51 & passim (arguing credit card
companies target financially vulnerable borrowers to make larger profits off their inability
to pay in a timely fashion and do not serve well this borrowing population).
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